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I. INTRODUCTION
Single-asset real estate bankruptcy cases have generated more than
their fair share of controversial issues.' These cases often focus on the
treatment of secured (usually undersecured) claims. 2 The struggle in
many single asset cases is between the equityholders in the debtor and a
secured lender with a lien on all the debtor's significant assets.3 Accord-
ingly, the rights of secured creditors are the focal point in many cases.4
For example, courts currently disagree on the treatment of net rents5
1. The American Bankruptcy Institute devoted the inaugural edition of its law review to the
issue of single asset bankruptcy cases. See I AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 2 (Spring 1993)
(published in conjunction with St. John's University School of Law).
2. Craig H. Averch et al., The Right of Oversecured Creditors to Default Rates of Interest
from a Debtor in Bankruptcy, 47 Bus. LAW. 961 (May 1992) ("Few legal issues have created
more confusion or spawned more litigation than the rights of secured creditors in bankruptcy
cases."). See also United States Savings Ass'n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs.,
Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 369-79 (1988) (holding that undersecured creditors are not entitled to
postpetition interest as a form of adequate protection for lost opportunity costs).
3. See Michael L. Molinaro, Single-Asset Real Estate Bankruptcies: Curbing an Abuse of
the Bankruptcy Process, 24 U.C.C. L.J. 161, 166-71 (1991); H. Miles Cohn, Single Asset Chapter
11 Cases, 26 TULSA L.J. 523, 528 (1991); Brian S. Katz, Single-Asset Real Estate Cases and the
Good Faith Requirement: Why Reluctance to Ask Whether a Case Belongs in Bankruptcy May
Lead to the Incorrect Result, 9 BANKR. DEV. J. 77 (1992).
4. A related issue is whether single asset realty cases are the proper subject of bankruptcy
relief at all. See, e.g., In re Dollar Assocs., 172 B.R. 945, 950 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1994). The
authors do not address this issue. Nonetheless, the existence of this issue must be kept in mind
when addressing any other issue involving the rights of creditors in such cases. See Honorable
Lisa Hill Fenning, The Future of Chapter 11: One View from the Bench, 1993-94 Norton, Annual
Survey of Bankruptcy Law, 113, 126-27 (1993); W. Scott Carlisle, III, Single Asset Real Estate In
Chapter 11 - Need For Reform, 25 REAL PROP., PROB. AND TR. J. 673, 674 (1991).
5. The term "net rents" refers to the revenues generated from improved real estate after
payment of ordinary and necessary expenses associated with operation of the underlying real
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tendered to the lender during the pendency of a chapter 11 case.6 In
general, net rents are often paid to the primary secured lender during a
Chapter 11 case.7 Courts disagree on whether these payments should be
categorized as adequate protection payments, interest payments, return
of collateral, or reduction of a prepetition claims.8
Some courts have concluded that receipt of net rents during the
pendency of a Chapter 11 case must reduce the prepetition claim (either
the secured or unsecured portion of the claim) of an undersecured credi-
tor.9 These courts conclude that because undersecured creditors are not
entitled to accrue postpetition interest or to be compensated for lost
opportunity costs under existing precedent of the United States Supreme
Court,'0 the principal amount of the claim, determined as of the petition
date, must be reduced by the amount of postpetition rents received."l
Other courts have determined that an undersecured creditor's receipt of
net rents is merely a return of collateral-albeit cash collateral-with no
corresponding reduction to the prepetition claim.' 2
The existing uncertainty focuses on the proper interpretation of the
Supreme Court's decision in the Timbers case. 13 So far, the courts have
not resolved the tension between (i) the mandate in Timbers that under-
secured creditors are not entitled to compensation for their lost opportu-
nity costs and (ii) the receipt of net rents by an undersecured creditor
holding a lien on income-producing property.' 4 In addition, in valuing a
property and improvements. See In re Landing Assocs., Ltd., 122 B.R. 288, 291 n.2, 297 n.7
(Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990).
6. Compare In re Reddington/Sunarrow Ltd. Partnership, 119 B.R. 809, 813-814 (Bankr.
D.N.M. 1990) (reducing secured claim by postpetition net rents received by undersecured lender)
and In re Club Assocs., 107 B.R. 385, 393-398 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1989) (reducing unsecured
portion of claim by postpetition net rents received by undersecured lender), with In re Landing
Assocs., Ltd., 122 B.R. 288, 293, 298 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990) (determining undersecured
creditor's receipt of net rents was a return of collateral) and In re Flagler-at-First Assocs., Ltd.,
114 B.R. 297, 301 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1990) (same).
7. See Bonnie K. Donahue & W. David Edwards, The Treatment of Assignments of Rents in
Bankruptcy: Emerging Issues Relating to Perfection, Cash Collateral, and Plan Confirmation, 48
Bus. LAW. 633 (Feb. 1993).
8. Grant T. Stein, Options for Handling Adequate Protection Payments for Rents, FAULKNER
& GiAY's BANKR. L. REv. 18 (Fall 1991).
9. See In re Reddington/Sunarrow, 119 B.R. at 814 and In re Club Assocs., 107 R.B. at 394.
10. See United Savings Ass'n. of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S.
365, 382 (1988) (undersecured creditors are not entitled to postpetition interest as adequate
protection for lost opportunity costs).
11. Id.
12. See In re Flagler-at-First Assocs., Ltd., 114 B.R. at 301.
13. United Savings Ass'n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365
(1988).
14. David G. Carlson, Adequate Protection Payments and the Surrender of Cash Collateral in
Chapter 11 Reorganization, 15 CARDOZO L. REv. 1357, 1370-71 (1994) [hereinafter Carlson,
Adequate Protection].
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secured claim, the courts have not fully explored the relationship
between the value of income-producing collateral (determined under the
so-called "income approach") and the realization of the expected
income. 15
The authors suggest that the postpetition net rents received by an
undersecured creditor should reduce the amount of the undersecured
claim only if the net rents exceed the amount of interest accrued, at the
applicable contract rate,' 6 under the creditor's prepetition agreement. In
accordance with established precedent under the former Bankruptcy Act
of 1898,17 undersecured creditors are entitled to postpetition interest
from income producing collateral.18 If, however, the income produced
by the collateral exceeds the amount of interest accruing under the
prepetition loan agreement, the excess should be used for the benefit of
the debtor's estate. This view is consistent with Timbers, 9 the Bank-
ruptcy Code2° and pre-Bankruptcy Code law.2'
This Article is based on the following observations:
(1) The Timbers decision did not address an undersecured
creditor's entitlement to postpetition interest from postpetition
income generated from prepetition collateral.22  Arguably, Timbers
does not prohibit such payments.23
15. See generally Leslie K. Beckhart, No Intrinsic Value: The Failure of Traditional Real
Estate Appraisal Methods To Value Income-Producing Property, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 2251 (1993).
16. For purposes of this Article, the authors have assumed that the prevailing market rate of
interest is not significantly different from the contract rate. The authors believe, however, that in
the absence of a controlling state law or statutory prohibition, the contract rate would govern over
the prevailing market rate. Averch, supra note 2, at 990 (concluding contract default rate of
interest should control). The discussion of appropriate rate of interest is outside the scope of this
Article. For an in-depth explanation of interest rates for secured claims, see Aneel M. Pandey,
Determining Interest and Discount Rates Applicable to Secured Claims in the Specter of
Bankruptcy Law, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 549 (1993).
17. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-1255)
(1976) (repealed 1978).
18. See David G. Carlson, Postpetition Interest Under the Bankruptcy Code, 43 U. MIAMI L.
REv. 577, 591 (1989).
19. See Robert E. Scott, Sharing the Risks of Bankruptcy: Timbers, Ahlers, and Beyond,
1989 COL. Bus. L. REV. 183, 185 n.5 (1989).
20. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, 2608 amended by
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333;
Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986, Pub. L.
No. 99-554, 100 Stat. 3008; Retiree Benefits Bankruptcy Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-
334, 102 Stat. 610; Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4789; Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106 (codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330
(1988 & Supp. I11 1994) (the "Bankruptcy Code").
21. Seth D. Gould, Comment, Unsecured Creditors' Entitlement to Postpetition Interest In
Solvent Debtor Bankruptcy: The Code's Silent Abrogation Qf A Pre-Code Doctrine, 37 WAYNE
L. REv. 1849, 1852 (1991).
22. See Scott, supra note 19.
23. Howard J. Weg, The Secured Creditor's Rights to Rents from Real Property, 17 REAL
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(2) The Bankruptcy Code does not address the undersecured
creditor's right to postpetition interest from the encumbered postpeti-
tion income derived from prepetition collateral.24 The pre-Bank-
ruptcy Code practice, however, is clear: undersecured creditors were
entitled to postpetition interest from income-producing collateral. 25
(3) A credible argument can be made that the value of a
secured claim determined under section 506(a) of the Bankruptcy
Code includes encumbered postpetition net rent and, therefore, the
value of the "secured claim" is increased by the net rents regardless
of the appraised value of the underlying property.26 An undersecured
creditor, however, cannot be entitled to both the net rents as part of
its secured claim and postpetition interest on its secured claim. By
definition, there are not enough net rents to pay interest and increase
the secured claim.
(4) Section 552(b) of the Bankruptcy Code gives a bankruptcy
court the equitable discretion to disencumber a prepetition lien on
postpetition rents.27 Courts should utilize this equitable discretion to
limit payments made to an undersecured creditor to accrued interest
at the applicable contract rate. To allow the undersecured creditor to
receive the full net rents in excess of interest would allow the under-
secured creditor its full lost opportunity cost, in violation of Timbers.
Part II of this Article illustrates the issue by describing a common
fact pattern and including a discussion of various alternatives adopted by
the published case law. Part III of this Article analyzes security interests
in rents and leases, while Part IV provides an overview of the treatment
of secured claims in bankruptcy. Included in Part IV is a comparison of
interest to adequate protection payments and rents, and a discussion of
general principles of valuation of property in bankruptcy cases. In addi-
tion, Part IV addresses the proper treatment of net rents in light of the
statutory construction of the Bankruptcy Code. A statutory and policy
EST. L.J. 29, 47 n.4l (1988) ("Timbers does not bear directly on the subject of the secured
creditor's rights to rents from real property, but the Court's analysis of Sections 506(b) and 552(b)
of the Bankruptcy Code does appear to confirm that a secured creditor with a perfected security
interest in postpetition rents from real property is entitled to apply the postpetition rents received
to any postpetition interest that accrues on the secured creditor's claim, whether the claim is
oversecured or undersecured.").
24. 11 U.S.C. §§ 105(a), 502(b)(2), 506(b), 726(a)(5), 1129, 1225, and 1325.
25. Sexton v. Dreyfus, 219 U.S. 339, 346 (1911).
26. In re Bloomingdale Partners, 160 B.R. 93, 100-101 (Bankr. N.D. I11. 1993).
27. 11 U.S.C. § 552(b). Section 552(b) was amended as part of the Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106. Under prior law, a prepetition security interest in
rents generated postpetition was recognized only "to then extent provided by ... [the security
agreement and by applicable non-bankruptcy law. ... 11 U.S.C. 552(b) (1993) (emphasis
added). The amendment deletes the italicized language. See 108 Stat. 4106, § 214(a)(3).
Although Congress's intent may have been to preserve a security interest in rents that was not
perfected under state law, it remains unclear how a court can determine, without refernece to state
law, the "extent" to which a security agreement applies to rents.
1994]
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analysis is provided in Part V. Finally, Part VI concludes that the Bank-
ruptcy Code and fundamental bankruptcy policies allow an undersecured
creditor the right to postpetition interest, accruing at the applicable con-
tract rate, from the net rents received.28
II. CLASSIC SCENARIO
The following hypothetical situation illustrates the potential alter-
native treatments of an undersecured creditor's receipt of net rents:
Basic Fee-Simple Development Corp. ("BFD") acquires Run-of-the-
Mill Apartments for $16 million. Credit Yield Association ("CYA")
financed 100% of the acquisition. CYA holds a first lien on the Run-
of-the-Mill Apartments and a "perfected" lien on the leases and rents.
BFD is unable to make its monthly interest payment to CYA at the
note rate of 10% per annum because Run-of-the-Mill generated only
$1 million per year of net operating income. Consequently, BFD
files a voluntary petition under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.
During the first week of the case, BFD and CYA enter into an agreed
cash collateral order allowing BFD to use the rents to pay ordinary
and necessary operating expenses. The agreed order further provides
that the net rents shall be delivered to CYA on a monthly basis. Two
years later, after CYA has received $2.4 million in net rents, BFD
proposes a plan to pay CYA the present value of its secured claim.
The unsecured portion of CYA's claim, and all other unsecured
claims, would receive a cash payment. The value of the Run-of-the-
Mill Apartments is $10 million both at the date of confirmation and
on the petition date.
Assuming that the agreed cash collateral order is silent on the issue
of the application of the postpetition rents received by CYA, how should
the net rents be accounted for? There are several alternatives.
A. Reduction of the Secured Claim
Under Timbers, CYA is not entitled to postpetition interest as com-
pensation for its lost opportunity costs. 29 In addition, unsecured credi-
tors generally are not allowed payment before confirmation of a
reorganization plan."° Some courts, therefore, would reduce the
"secured claim" of CYA from $10 million to $7.6 million to account for
the $2.4 million received during the pendency of the case."' This first
28. See supra note 16.
29. United Savings Ass'n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365
(1988) [hereinafter Timbers].
30. See, B & W Enters., Inc. v. Goodman Oil Co., 713 F.2d 534, 537 (9th Cir. 1983) (refusing
to allow postpetition payments to suppliers under the "necessity of payment" rule).
31. See, e.g., In re 354 East 66th St. Realty Corp., 177 B.R. 776, 781 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1995);
In re Kalian, 169 BR. 503, 507 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1994); In re IPC Atlanta Ltd. Partnership, 142 B.R.
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alternative is represented in In re Reddington.32
In Reddington, the bankruptcy court concluded that the creditor's
prepetition secured claim had to be reduced by the amount of the postpe-
tition rent payments received. 33 The debtor, Reddington/Sunarrow Lim-
ited Partnership ("Reddington"), owned an apartment complex located
in El Paso, Texas. Victoria Savings Association ("Victoria") held a first
lien on the apartment complex and on the rents. 34 The Reddington court
entered an Agreed Order Regarding Interim Use Of Cash Collateral And
Providing Adequate Protection. The cash collateral order provided that
Victoria would receive a portion of the rents as adequate protection of its
security interest in the rents. Victoria received payments of approxi-
mately $600,000. Victoria was owed approximately $5,400,000. 3s
Reddington proposed a plan of reorganization in which Victoria
would receive a promissory note in the approximate principal amount of
$4 million.36 The parties stipulated that the property had a fair market
value of $4 million.37 Reddington proposed to reduce the secured claim
by the amount of the postpetition payments made pursuant to the cash
collateral order. Reddington admitted that if the secured claim was not
reduced, the plan would not be feasible within the meaning of section
1129(a)(11) of the Bankruptcy Code.38 Victoria stipulated that its collat-
eral had not decreased in value during the pendency of the case.39
Victoria argued that if the rents had been sequestered, the value of
the collateral would have increased and in turn the amount of the
secured claim would have increased. Victoria, therefore, contended that
its secured position would have eroded over time.4°
The Reddington court concluded that the amount of the creditor's
secured claim for adequate protection purposes was the value of the col-
lateral as of the petition date.41 The court also concluded that Victoria's
secured claim had to be reduced; otherwise, Victoria was an under-
secured creditor that improperly received postpetition payments.42 The
547, 558-59 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1992); Confederation Life Ins. Co. v. Beau Rivage, Ltd., 126 B.R.
632, 641 (N.D. Ga. 1991) ("If payments are made to an undersecured creditor, they must be
allowed to reduce the allowed secured claim of the creditor."); In re Reddington/Sunarrow Ltd.
Partnership, 119 B.R. 809, 813 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1990) (same).
32. 119 B.R. 809 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1990).
33. Id. at 814.
34. Id. at 810.
35. Id. at 810-11.
36. Id. at 811.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 812.
41. Id. at 813.
42. Id.
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court rejected Victoria's argument, concluding that "[w]hether the alle-
gation is that the payments are adequate protection payments, interest
payments or lost opportunity costs, the Supreme Court in Timbers made
it clear that an undersecured creditor whose collateral is not depreciating
is not entitled to such payments. 43 According to the Reddington court,
"[i]n Timbers, the Court was concerned that an undersecured creditor
not improve its position with respect to other creditors."" The Redding-
ton court concluded that "[i]f payments are made to an undersecured
creditor, they must be allowed to reduce the allowed secured claim of
the creditor. Otherwise the payments would be treated as interest pay-
ments or use value, in direct contravention of Timbers and § 506." 45
The Reddington court's analysis is based on a number of assump-
tions that are questionable. First, the Timbers court did not address
whether the creditor was entitled to postpetition interest because its col-
lateral produced income that could be used to pay interest.46 Second,
Timbers did not address whether a creditor is entitled to postpetition
payments of interest from encumbered collateral.47 Third, Timbers may
not prohibit undersecured creditors from receiving payments generated
from encumbered collateral during a bankruptcy case.48
Similarly, in In re IPC Atlanta Ltd. Partnership,49 the bankruptcy
court concluded that Timbers mandated that the creditor apply postpeti-
tion rents received to reduce its secured claim even though the creditor
had a perfected security interest in the rents.5 ° In IPC, the debtor owned
an apartment complex located in Clayton County, Georgia. The debtor
purchased the property for $2,516,683.05, and as part of the purchase
price, assumed a loan from the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corpora-
tion ("Freddie Mac").
After defaulting under its loan, the debtor filed a Chapter 11 peti-
tion. As of the petition date, the amount of Freddie Mac's claim was
$1,782,114. The court entered an agreed cash collateral order authoriz-
ing the debtor to use rents and to pay Freddie Mac the net rents remain-
ing after payment of operating expenses. 2
The debtor proposed a plan of reorganization pursuant to which
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Robert E. Scott, Sharing the Risks of Bankruptcy: Timbers, Ahlers, and Beyond, 1989
COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 183, 185 n.5 (1989).
47. Timbers, 484 U.S. 365.
48. Id.
49. 142 B.R. 547 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1992).
50. Id. at 559.
51. Id. at 549.
52. Id.
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Freddie Mac would receive a new note in the amount of $1,350,000.
The plan also provided that the postpetition payments made to Freddie
Mac would be used to make the first eight payments due under the
plan.5 3
Freddie Mac contended that the payments should not be used to
reduce its secured claim because they were adequate protection pay-
ments. Arguing that it had a security interest in both the real property
and the rents, and that the debtor used the rents, Freddie Mac contended
that it was entitled to adequate protection as compensation.14 The bank-
ruptcy court rejected these arguments."
The IPC court noted that Freddie Mac had a claim for $1,782,114.
The court reasoned that if Freddie Mac was allowed to keep the postpeti-
tion payments without crediting them to reduce the debt, then Freddie
Mac, an undersecured creditor, would be receiving both the entire
amount of its claim and the postpetition payments.5 6 The court con-
cluded that in these circumstances, the creditor would be receiving more
than the amount of its claim, 57 and that this situation would result in
Freddie Mac receiving postpetition interest in violation of Timbers.5
The court also held that if Freddie Mac were right, the amount of its
secured claim would grow during the pendency of the case in violation
of Timbers. 9
The IPC case raises many of the same questions presented in the
Reddington decision. As stated above, Timbers arguably does not pre-
vent an undersecured creditor from receiving postpetition interest from
encumbered collateral.6° Second, the IPC court incorrectly assumed that
allowing the creditor to receive postpetition payments without crediting
the debt would cause the creditor's secured claim to increase.61
An undersecured lender can avoid this unfavorable result through
careful consideration of the language contained in the cash collateral
order.62 The following provision protects the undersecured creditor in a
cash collateral order:
53. Id. at 551, 558.
54. Id. at 558.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 559.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Scott, supra note 46.
61. 142 B.R. at 559.
62. Craig H. Averch, Bankruptcy Documents: Selected Drafting Issues (Including Issues in
Anticipation of Insolvency), presented at the ALI-ABA Course of Study on Real Estate Defaults,
Workouts, and Reorganizations, held August 26-28, 1993 in Coronado, California, Vol. I, at 301,
348-52.
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All Rents, including any Rents used by the Debtor pursuant to this
Order shall be deemed to be part of the Lenders' collateral for pur-
poses for determining the value and amount of the Lender's secured
claim under section 506(a) of the Bankruptcy Code and added to the
value of the remaining Property on the projected effective date of
confirmation for purposes of determining the amount of, and the
treatment to be afforded to, the Lender's allowed secured claim in the
context of any plan of reorganization or liquidation in this case, and
no recovery, charges or assessment shall be allowable or claimed
under Section 506(c) against the Lender by reason of any expenditure
of Rents by the Debtor.6 3
Of course, without sufficient negotiation leverage, the undersecured
creditor is unlikely to get such a concession from the debtor.
In In re Oaks Partners, Ltd.,64 the bankruptcy court held that a
debtor's plan of reorganization properly applied postpetition payments
made to a secured creditor to reduce the creditor's secured claim.65 In
Oaks Partners, the creditor's claim as of the petition date was
$14,360,000. Pursuant to the debtor's motion, the court determined that
the value of the property was $12,036,200. During the pendency of the
case, the debtor had paid the secured creditor a total of $3,111,227.66
In its plan of reorganization, the debtor proposed that the creditor's
claim be reduced by the amount of postpetition payments made to the
lender. The debtor agreed with the creditor that payments should be
applied to the creditor's debt only up to the point that the payments
equaled the value of the project. The creditor argued that its claim
should not be reduced to the extent that payments were made from rents.
The court stated: "The fundamental problem with [the creditor's] argu-
ment is that if the payments of $3,155,834.00 are not applied to the debt,
why were they made and what were they for? If they are not applied to
the debt, what are they - a gift?" 67 These questions were never
answered to the court's satisfaction.
In Confederation Life Ins. Co. v. Beau Rivage Ltd.,68 the district
court affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision that Timbers would be
violated unless the creditor's adequate protection payments were applied
to reduce the creditor's allowed secured claim. 69 In Beau Rivage, the
debtor's sole significant asset was an apartment complex that it
purchased in 1981. In 1986, debtor Beau Rivage obtained a refinancing
63. Id. at 352.
64. 135 B.R. 440 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1991).
65. Id. at 451.
66. Id. at 441.
67. Id. at 449.
68. 126 B.R. 632 (N.D. Ga. 1991).
69. Id. at 640.
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loan from creditor Confederation Life Insurance Company ("Confedera-
tion Life") in the approximate amount of $9.8 million. The loan was
secured by a deed of trust on the real property and an assignment of
rents.7 °
On November 29, 1989, Beau Rivage filed its Chapter 11 petition.
Confederation Life then filed a proof of claim in the amount of
$11,001,455. On April 11, 1990, the bankruptcy court authorized Beau
Rivage to pay Confederation Life half of its $85,099 monthly mortgage
payment for the months of February and March, and full mortgage pay-
ments for each month thereafter as adequate protection for use of the
cash collateral.71
On May 2, 1990, the bankruptcy court entered an order valuing the
property at $9,300,000. Confederation Life requested the bankruptcy
court modify the order because it did not take into account its security
interest in postpetition rents. The bankruptcy court denied the motion.72
In its plan of reorganization, Beau Rivage provided that the amount
of Confederation Life's claim was $9,953,474.73 The plan also provided
that the first four adequate protection payments would be applied to
reduce the principal amount of the debt.74
Confederation Life appealed the Bankruptcy court's order confirm-
ing the plan to the federal district court. First, relying on Flagler-at-
First,75 Confederation Life argued that the pre-confirmation adequate
protection payments should not be used to offset postconfirmation plan
obligations. Second, it argued that the bankruptcy court undervalued its
secured claim by not considering pre-confirmation rents.76
The district court agreed with the bankruptcy court that Confedera-
tion Life's reliance on Flagler was misplaced. The bankruptcy court
concluded that the Flagler court neglected to consider "the possible
increase in value of the primary collateral as a result of the infusion of
rent proceeds. 77 Specifically, the court concluded that Beau Rivage's
use of the rents increased the value of the real property and that this
transfer of value was reflected in the valuation order.7"
The district court also concluded that Timbers required that the
postpetition payments be used to reduce the amount of Confederation
70. Id. at 633.
71. Id. at 634.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 634 n.I.
74. Id. at 639.
75. In re Flagler-at-First Assocs., Ltd., 114 B.R. 297 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1990).
76. 126 B.R. at 638.
77. Id. at 639.
78. Id. at 641.
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Life's second claim. According to the district court, the Timbers court
"was concerned that an undersecured creditor not improve its position
with respect to other creditors."79
B. Reduction of the Unsecured Claim
Alternatively, some courts would reduce the "unsecured claim" of
CYA from $6 million to $3.6 million to account for the $2.4 million in
postpetition rent.80 CYA should prefer this result to a reduction of its
secured claim. Of course, if unsecured creditors are receiving a 20%
distribution on the account of unsecured claims under the plan proposed
by BFD, CYA has received more than its pro rata share. By crediting
the $2.4 million to the unsecured claim of CYA, it could be argued that
CYA must return $1.2 million to avoid having received better treatment
on the account of its unsecured claim than other holders of unsecured
claims.
This effect is demonstrated in Club Associates."1 In Club Associ-
ates, Consolidated Capital Realty Corporation ("CCRC") was owed
approximately $22 million on a secured wraparound note executed by
the debtor (Club Associates). The underlying lien was worth approxi-
mately $7.8 million. During the time the Chapter 11 case was pending,
Club Associates paid CCRC approximately $4.3 million in net rents. In
turn, CCRC used a substantial portion of the $4.3 million to pay on a
current basis the underlying debt.82
The bankruptcy court valued the property at $18.75 million, giving
CCRC, an undersecured creditor, a secured claim of $18.75 million and
an unsecured claim of $3.25 million. The bankruptcy court refused to
give CCRC credit for any amounts that CCRC paid on the underlying
debt and reduced CCRC's total indebtedness by approximately $3.8 mil-
lion (i.e., the $4.3 million less tax escrow payments). Thus, CCRC lost
its unsecured claim and had its secured claim reduced to $18.1 million.
Given the fact that CCRC only received a small portion of the $3.8 mil-
lion, the result in Club Associates seems especially harsh. 3
The reduction of the unsecured portion of an undersecured credi-
tor's claim is arguably inconsistent with the general prohibition against
the payment of an unsecured creditor's prepetition claim during the pen-
dency of a Chapter 11 case.8 4 Only in limited circumstances have courts
79. Id. at 640.
80. In re Club Assocs., 107 B.R. 385, 393-98 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1989).
81. Id. at 397-98.
82. Id. at 392.
83. Id. at 398.
84. See Russell A. Eisenberg & Frances F. Gecker, The Doctrine of Necessity and Its
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authorized payments of prepetition unsecured claims. One such situa-
tion is when key creditors have threatened to withhold essential supplies
or services unless prepetition claims are paid.85  Another situation is
when payment of prepetition claims is intended to improve future prof-
its, such as honoring frequent flyer programs so customers will not boy-
cott the debtor-airline or paying employees so they will not desert the
ship, or worse yet, wreak havoc on their way out. 6 Applying rent pay-
ments to reduce the Lender's unsecured claim, therefore, poses signifi-
cant problems.
C. Return of Collateral
Finally, the recent trend is to conclude that the lender merely
received a return of its collateral.8 7 Under this analysis, if CYA had not
received the $2.4 million in rents during the case, CYA's secured claim
would have been increased by $2.4 million. Instead of leaving the net
rent in the hands of BFD and increasing the secured claim of CYA to
$12.4 million, CYA received $2.4 million and, therefore, its secured
claim remains at $10 million. This analysis has a lot of appeal,88 espe-
Parameters, 73 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 5 (1989); Hon. W. Donald Boe, Jr., Necessity, The Mother of
All Excuses, 12 NORTON BANKR. L. ADVISER 1, 6 (December 1991).
85. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Sharon Steel Corp., 159 B.R. 730, 736-37 (Bankr. W.D.
Pa. 1993).
86. See In re Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc., 124 B.R. 1021, 1023 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1991).
87. See, e.g., In re Union Meeting Partners, 178 B.R. 664, 677 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995); In re
Columbia Office Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 175 B.R. 199, 204 (Bankr. D. Md. 1994); In re
Johansen, Thackery, MacKenzie Properties, Ltd., 166 B.R. 962, 963 (D. Utah 1994); In re Veeco
Ins., Co., 170 B.R. 149, 153 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1994); Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Paradise Springs
Assocs. (In re Paradis Springs Assocs.), 165 B.R. 913, 926 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1993); In re
Bloomingdale Partners, 155 B.R 961, 975-76 (Bankr. N.D. 111. 1993); In re Vermont Inv. Ltd.
Partnership, 142 B.R. 571, 573-576 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1992); In re Flagler-at-First Assocs., Ltd., 114
B.R. 297, 302 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1990); In re Landing Assocs., 122 B.R. 288, 297 (Bankr. W.D.
Tex. 1990).
88. Indeed, one renowned bankruptcy commentator finds the return-of-collateral argument
"irresistible." Letter from Jay L. Westbrook, Benno C. Schmidt, Chair of Business Law The
University of Texas at Austin School of Law, to Craig H. Averch, Jan. 13, 1994 (on file with
authors). Specifically, Professor Westbrook states:
If one once concludes that rents are products included in the lien like proceeds under
that section, why isn't the return of collateral analysis irresistible? It is true that one
encounters some conundra and anomalies along the way, especially in that one
ordinarily wants to value a secured claim at filing. But if you have a $100,000 debt
secured by a genuine Fred Jones sculpture worth $50,000 at the time of filing and
Fred then helpfully dies, making the sculpture worth $125,000, none of us would
doubt that your secured claim is now oversecured. Why not the same result when
your $50 goose lays a $100,000 egg? And if that is true, why not the proceeds of
lotsa ordinary eggs? Or rents?
Id. Like Professor Westbrook some bankruptcy courts have drawn the same conclusion. Such a
conclusion, however, misses two important points. First, although section 552(b) provides an
exception to the general rule that a prepetition lien extends to postpetition after-acquired prop-
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cially for secured creditors. There are, however, several problems to
overcome with this analysis, including the Timbers decision.
In re Flagler-at-First Associates, Ltd.8 9 illustrates this return-of-
collateral approach. In Flagler, the debtor had paid its undersecured
lender almost seventy thousand dollars a month under an agreed order
allowing use of cash collateral. The debtor argued that the payments
should be applied to reduce the lender's secured claim. The debtor con-
tended that under Timbers, an undersecured creditor is not entitled to
adequate protection payments, as such, unless the value of the collateral
is declining. In the debtor's view, therefore, the payments had to be
credited against the secured portion of the lender's claim.
The court first distinguished Timbers and the handful of bankruptcy
court decisions which suggest that reduction of the secured claim is
appropriate. 90 As the court noted, Timbers did not involve a lien on
postpetition rents under section 552(b) of the Bankruptcy Code. Indeed,
the Supreme Court implied in dicta that the result might have been dif-
ferent if section 552(b) had been applicable.9' The effect of Timbers is
to prohibit payments for postpetition lost opportunity costs, not pay-
ments to protect rights in postpetition collateral.92 Thus, the court in
Flagler refused to apply Timbers as broadly as the debtor requested.
According to the Flagler court, because the lender clearly held a
security interest in postpetition rents, the accrual of rents caused the
amount of the lender's secured claim to rise over time.93 However, the
amount of the secured claim must then be reduced - by the same
amount - because the lender would have already received the money:
The result is essentially a "wash" in that the additional collateral
value represented by the excess rents is to be set-off by the fact that
[the lender] has already received them during the course of the Chap-
ter 11. No further reduction of the [lender's] secured claim is
appropriate.94
erty-like postpetition rents-section 552(b) also contains an "equities exception" to the excep-
tion. The conclusion that satisfying the section 552(b) exception ends the analysis makes the
equities exception to the exception in section 552(b) meaningless. That is, a court should give
effect to all of the language in section 552(b) and ending the analysis half-way through the section
fails to acknowledge the remainder. Second, Timbers denies the right of an undersecured creditor
to lost opportunity costs. As discussed, infra, allowing a creditor to receive all the net rents
without application arguably violates the mandate of Timbers. Moreover, as discussed, infra, the
return of collateral argument posits difficulties in determining the secured claim for both section
506(a) and 1129(b) purposes.
89. 114 B.R. 297 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1990).
90. Id. at 299.
91. Timbers, 484 U.S. at 374.
92. Flagler, 114 B.R. at 303.
93. Id. at 302.
94. Id.
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In In re Vermont Investment Limited Partnership,9 the bankruptcy
court also adopted the return of collateral view. In Vermont Investment,
the debtor owned an office building located in the District of Columbia
that was worth $19.1 million. Homefed Bank, F.S.B. ("Homefed") held
a deed of trust on the building and a security interest in the revenues
generated therefrom.96 As of the petition date, Homefed was owed
$18,828,820.16 in principal and $559,537.16 in interest. 97 During the
pendency of the case, the debtor paid $1,445,690.18 to Homefed. The
bank applied this amount first to outstanding prepetition interest in the
amount of $559,537.16, and then to postpetition interest and taxes in the
amount of $670,763.98
Homefed requested relief from the automatic stay. The debtor con-
tended that the motion should be denied because the postpetition pay-
ments should be applied to the prepetition principal balance of
Homefed's allowed secured claim, which would have given Homefed a
significant equity cushion.99
The Vermont Investment court rejected this argument. First, the
court concluded that the debtor's argument ignored that "rents are collat-
eral distinct from the underlying real estate and that post-petition interest
accruals may be collected from such rent collateral by virtue of 11
U.S.C. § 552(b)."' 00 The court then reasoned that the payments resulted
in a "wash" because the postpetition rents both increased the amount of
the bank's allowed secured claim and decreased the allowed claim when
they were paid to the lender.101
The Vermont Investment court then concluded that the Timbers
decision supported the lender. The court emphasized that Timbers
addressed the narrow issue of "whether an undersecured creditor is enti-
tled to payments for the 'lost opportunity costs,'" and did not address
the proper "application of payments [based] on a security interest in
rents."
102
In In re Bloomingdale Partners,10 3 as of the petition date, the
lender held an $11,160,387 claim secured by collateral worth $10 mil-
lion. A postpetition cash collateral order provided that the lender was to
95. 142 B.R. 571 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1992).
96. Id. at 572.
97. Id. at 573.
98. Id.
99. Id. An "equity cushion" exists when the value of a lender's collateral exceeds the
outstanding amount of the secured debt. See Paula A. Franzese, Secured Financing's Uneasy
Place in Bankruptcy: Claims for Interests in Chapter 11, 19 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1, 3 (1991).
100. Vermont Investment, 142 B.R. at 573.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 574.
103. 155 B.R. 961 (Bankr. N.D. 111. 1993).
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"receive net rents ,after payment of ordinary and necessary operating
expenses."'" The debtor's proposed treatment of the secured portion of
the lender's claim in the debtor's second amended plan was based on the
assumption that net rent payments during the case would be deducted
from the amount of the secured claim. The court rejected this premise,
noting that the debtor's analysis ignored the effect of section 552(b). °5
The court did treat the net rents as prepayments of the lender's claim,
although accrual of the net rents caused the secured portion of the
lender's claim to increase commensurately, thereby leaving the secured
and undersecured interests unaffected by the prepaid net rents.
The debtor filed a third amended plan and again requested confir-
mation. This time, the lender argued that the section 506(a) bifurcation
of its claim was frozen as of the petition date, and that accrual of net
rents during the case caused the lender to become oversecured. There-
fore, according to the lender, postpetition interest was collectible as to
the secured portion of the Lender's claim under both section 506(b) and
Timbers. The court rejected this argument, noting that valuation for
confirmation purposes is as of the confirmation date.10 6 With one minor
refinement, the court stuck by its original treatment of the rents, analyz-
ing them as prepayments of the lender's allowed claim."0 7
One of the problems with the return-of-collateral approach is that,
in some circumstances, the undersecured creditor may get a recovery
that is both inequitable and contrary to Timbers. This would occur when
the amount of net rents exceeds the amount of accrued interest. In Tim-
bers, the undersecured creditor was not entitled to postpetition interest
as compensation for lost opportunity cost. In the preceding hypothetical,
the undersecured creditor arguably is receiving more than interest on its
secured claim by obtaining net rents. Generally, interest should be less
than rent.'08 Otherwise, the borrower is better off defaulting. 0 9
Applying the return-of-collateral view to the hypothetical, CYA
would receive the net rents from Run-of-the-Mill Apartments without
reducing the amount of CYA's secured or unsecured claims. Thus,
CYA would be receiving its full opportunity costs. By receiving the net
rents, CYA is receiving precisely what it would have received from a
104. Id. at 975 n.8.
105. Id. at 975.
106. In re Bloomingdale Partners, 160 B.R. 93, 96-99 (Bankr. N.D. 111. 1993).
107. Id. at 99 ("post-petition payments made to [the secured creditor] shall be deemed
prepayments of [the secured creditor's] allowed claim, including § 506(b) interest, measured as of
the effective date of confirmation").
108. David G. Carlson, Postpetition Interest Under the Bankruptcy Code, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV.
577, 608 (1989).
109. Id.
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foreclosure. Therefore, CYA has not lost any opportunity costs. 10
Much of the confusion on the issue of accounting for net rents can
be traced to the historical treatment of security interests in leases and
rents. Part III examines this subject. Later in this Article, the authors
will show how these ancient concepts are manifested in modem bank-
ruptcy law.
III. COMMON LAW CONCEPTS OF SECURITY INTERESTS IN LEASES
AND RENTS
A. Generally
A security interest in rents and/or leases can be understood only in
light of the history underlying property law." ' Security interests in real
property are governed, for the most part, by historical common-law prin-
ciples.1 2 Although categorized as real property interests, leases, and the
rents derived therefrom, are far different from an underlying fee title
interest. 3 A lease is a nonfreehold estate. On the other hand, the real
property interest in the dirt, sticks, bricks, and mortar (i.e., the "fee inter-
est") is a freehold estate - freely divisible." 4
Historically, nonfreehold estates, like leases, were not well favored
by the law." 5 Indeed, nonfreehold estates were called by the "ambigu-
ous name chattels real and were treated as personal property for various
purposes."" 6 Leases create both personal property rights (i.e., contract
rights) and real property rights (i.e., the rights to occupy and use the
underlying real property).' 7 The landlord's interests during a tenancy
include contract rights to enforce covenants and the real property interest
of reversion after the leasehold estate expires or is terminated." 8 Both
the landlord's reversionary interest and contractual interest in the lease
110. Arguably, CYA has lost the opportunity to sell the Run-of-the-Mill Apartments and
reinvest the sale proceeds. However, because fully developed property does not generally sell for
an internal rate of return greater than the cash flow, and internal rates of return reflect investment
value, CYA's lost sale opportunity is not significant.
11. "[T]he law as to leases is not a matter of logic in (vacuum]; it is a matter of history that
has not forgotten Lord Coke." Gardiner v. Wm. S. Butler & Co., 245 U.S. 603, 605 (1918).
112. U.C.C. §§ 9-102(1) and 9-1040) (Uniform Commercial Code inapplicable to security
interests in real property). See generally R. Wilson Freyermuth, Of Hotel Revenues, Rents, and
Formalism in the Bankruptcy Courts: Implications for Reforming Commercial Real Estate
Finance, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1461, 1470-71 (1993).
113. See generally Patrick A. Randolph, Jr., The Mortgagee's Interest In Rents: Some Policy
Considerations and Proposals, 29 U. KAN. L. REV. 1 (1980).
114. See Frank S. Alexander, Federal Intervention in Real Estate Finance: Preemption and
Federal Common Law, 71 N.C. L. REv. 293, 300-03 (1993).
115. JOHN E. CRIBBET, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 52 (2d ed. 1975).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 196.
118. Id. at 224-25.
1994]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
can be mortgaged or assigned.'1 9
The right to receive rents derived from a real property lease is one
"stick" in the bundle of rights associated with the lease. Accrued rents
are personalty. Unaccrued rentals, however, are not personalty but are
incident to the reversion and follow the land.120 A transfer of rent, by
mortgage or assignment, does not "transfer an estate or interest in the
land but operates to transfer a mere chose in action [under existing
leases]."12 ' Consequently, a landlord cannot alienate an interest in rents
derived from the property in perpetuity unless such transfer of rents
includes the reversionary rights held by the landlord.' 22
A mortgage of the landlord's reversionary interest has an effect on
leases and rents. Assuming that the mortgagee has not received an
assignment of the rents or the leases, all leases not in existence before
the creation of the mortgage can be extinguished by foreclosing the
mortgage.1 23 Pre-existing leases, however, cannot be terminated by
foreclosure.124 Of course, with respect to post-mortgage leases, the
assignment of any rights under such leases, including the right to the
rents, is terminated by a foreclosing mortgagee,125 even if the mortgagee
did not obtain an assignment of the leases or rents. A foreclosing mort-
gagee that did not obtain an assignment of the rents and leases, however,
would take the property subject to any previous assignment of the rents
or leases in existence before the mortgage. If the landlord previously
assigned the leases and rents before the mortgage, the foreclosing mort-
gagee obtains only the reversionary interest of the landlord which is sub-
ject to the previous assignments. 26
The treatment of an interest in rents is substantially different from
the treatment of an interest in leases. 127 Because an assignment of rents
"operates to transfer a mere chose in action," the assignment can be
enforced through judicial proceedings (e.g., sequestration, receivership,
or similar actions) without foreclosing or otherwise obtaining a posses-
119. Any ownership interest in property that may be transferred, sold or conveyed may also be
mortgaged or conveyed in trust. See First Fed. Savs. of Ark., F.A. v. City Nat'l Bank of Fort
Smith, Ark., 87 B.R. 565, 566 (W.D. Ark. 1988) ("It is also familiar law, recognized everywhere,
that rent may not only be assigned absolutely but also by way of mortgage.").
120. CRIBBET, supra note 115, at 225.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. This is true regardless whether the state is a so-called lien theory or title theory
jurisdiction. GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 4.22, at 195
(2d ed. 1985).
124. Id. § 4.23, at 200.
125. Id. § 4.22, at 196 (title theory), § 4.23, at 199 (lien theory).
126. See CRIBBET, supra note 115, at 225.
127. Id.
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sory interest in the reversionary interest held by the landlord.128 Perhaps
because of a perceived liability associated with obtaining an assignment
of leases' z9 (or because of the follow-the-leader principle adopted by
many real estate attorneys), lenders often take an assignment of the rents
as part of the collateral package instead of an assignment of the leases.
These concepts are not just of historical importance. The disfavor
with which courts viewed security interest in "soft" collateral-rents,
accounts, inventory, and the like-is reflected in section 552(b) of the
Bankruptcy Code.130 On the other hand, secured interests in "hard" col-
lateral are almost sacrosanct under the Bankruptcy Code and are
required to be adequately protected.' 3 1 Section 552(b) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code, however, gives bankruptcy courts the power, to disencum-
ber postpetition rents and similar types of collateral.'3 2 As this Article
discusses, it is this equitable power that enables a court to cap an under-
secured creditor's recovery of net rents at the amount of accrued interest.
B. The Courts' Struggle with the Concept of Security Interest or
"Vested Assignment"
The confusion over the meaning of an assignment (even character-
ized in absolute form) of rents in mortgage lending transactions is mysti-
fying. The purpose of a mortgage lending transaction is to secure
repayment of a loan. Since the "intent" is to create a security interest,
and substance is supposed to prevail over form, courts have traditionally
looked through an absolute transfer in form to find a security interest. 133
Thus, if an indebtedness is left unaffected by form with a so-called
"absolute assignment" of rents, the intent (and substance) is the creation
of a security interest. 34
In a case involving the assignment of a construction contract, a
bankruptcy court looked through the form of an outright assignment to
find a pledge for security. 31 In stressing that form does not control over
substance, the bankruptcy court stated the following:
Courts should be extremely reluctant to give effect to lending docu-
128. Id.
129. Unless a covenant in a lease (i) pertained to a thing not in esse or (ii) did not "touch and
concern" the land, the assignee of the lease could be held liable for the landlord's breach of any
covenant in the lease. CRIBBET, supra note 115, at 197.
130. 11 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1988).
131. il U.S.C. §§ 361-363 (1988).
132. 11 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1988).
133. See generally NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 123, §§ 3.5-3.8 (2d. ed. 1985).
134. Id. at § 3.8, p. 49 ("The most important factor in determining whether an absolute deed is
a mortgage is whether there is an indebtedness on the part of the grantor to the grantee left
unaffected by the conveyance.").
135. OLM Assocs. v. Bright Banc Say. Ass'n, 98 B.R. 271, 275 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1989).
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ments that would obviate the need for a creditor to go through state
promulgated procedures to recover collateral. Judicial foreclosure
proceedings are required to recover pledged collateral unless a statute
provides otherwise. A creative draftsman should not be permitted to
allow a creditor to deprive a debtor of its due process rights under
state foreclosure laws. 136
When it comes to collateralization of rents, however, some courts
appear to exalt form over substance. In Federal Deposit Insurance Cor-
poration v. International Property Management, Inc.,137 a conservator of
a mortgagee sought to prohibit a management company hired by the
mortgagor from disbursing rental proceeds, following the mortgagor's
default on its obligations under deed of trust. A temporary restraining
order was issued, followed by a preliminary injunction. The mortgagor
intervened and counterclaimed, asserting a right to the rents collected
before the entry of the temporary restraining order. The United States
District Court for the Southern District of Texas entered summary judg-
ment on behalf of the conservator, and the mortgagor appealed. The
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that under Texas law, the assign-
ment-of-rents clause in the deed of trust passed immediate title to the
rent proceeds to the mortgagee, with enjoyment of rents postponed as
long as the mortgagor was not in default, rather than creating a security
interest which the mortgagee was required to perfect by taking some
affirmative action.' 31
In International Property, the court held that the particular assign-
ment-of-rents provision contained in the deed of trust did, in fact, consti-
tute an "absolute" assignment of rents under Texas law.13 9 The court
noted that the Texas Supreme Court in Taylor v. Brennan 40 had indi-
cated that an absolute assignment could be found in a mortgage loan
transaction, and that if such a provision existed, a Texas court would
enforce it.141 The court distinguished its holdings in Village Proper-
ties' 42 and Casbeer143 on two grounds. The first dealt with the language
of the provision in question, which stated that "the assignment contained
136. Id. (emphasis added).
137. 929 F.2d 1033 (5th Cir. 1991).
138. Id. at 1034.
139. Id. at 1038.
140. 621 S.W.2d 592 (Tex. 1981).
141. Int'l Property, 929 F.2d at 1035-36.
142. Wolters Village, Ltd. v. Village Properties, Ltd., 723 F.2d 441, 443 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 466 U.S. 974 (1984) (holding that a pledge of rents, if not clear as to the intent of the
parties to create an absolute assignment, merely creates a security interest in the rents).
143. Casbeer v. State Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Lubbock, 793 F.2d 1436, 1443-44 (5th Cir.
1986) (holding that a creditor with a security interest in rents must take some action before its
security interest becomes perfected).
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in this Section 5.2 is intended to be absolute, unconditional and pres-
ently effective."' 14 4 The court noted that the words "security" and
"pledge" were not used in this particular assignment of rents. 145 The
court emphasized the last sentence of the assignment of rents, which
provided that "[i]t shall never be necessary for [a] Holder to institute
legal proceedings of any kind whatsoever to enforce the provisions of
this [assignment]." '' 46 The court concluded that these provisions evi-
denced a "clear intent" by the parties that the assignment of rents provi-
sion be absolute. 147
The court also noted the following facts: (1) the borrower had not
been collecting rents directly from the tenants; (2) the rents being col-
lected by the borrower's agent were not deposited into the borrower's
account; (3) the rents were not commingled with any other funds in any
other accounts, but remained separate, identifiable proceeds from the
property; and (3) there was no dispute as to the rights of third parties.
The court's reasoning in footnote 7 of the opinion suggests that, had the
situation involved a borrower actually collecting the rents directly, a
commingling of rents with other funds, or the existence of third-party
claims to the rents, a different outcome could well have resulted.
48
The Fifth Circuit in International Property placed too much
emphasis on the collection of the rents by the secured creditor. The
collection by a secured creditor and/or lock box arrangement merely
gives the secured creditor additional control over its collateral. The
rents are nevertheless collateral securing the repayment of the loan.
Moreover, the International Property decision opens a Pandora's
box of other issues. For example, the acquisition of a property right by a
secured lender (i.e., the right to collect the rents in perpetuity) could
require apro tanto reduction of the debt.'49 The property right acquired
could be construed to be the entire value of the property. Under an
income-approach valuation, the right to receive the rents in perpetuity is
equal to the entire value of the property! Consequently, the pro tanto
reduction of the debt requirement could require the secured creditor to
credit the debt for the value of the property upon receipt of the "abso-
lute" assignment of the rents. This could lead to usury implications for
the creditor charging interest on the full uncredited debt.
144. 929 F.2d at 1037.
145. Id. at 1038.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1038 n.7.
149. See, e.g., In re Fry Road Assocs., Ltd., 66 B.R. 602, 605 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1986).
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IV. TREATMENT OF SECURED CLAIMS IN BANKRUPTCY-BASIC
PRINCIPLES
A. Generally
"The Bankruptcy Code replaced the terms secured creditor and
unsecured creditor with the terms secured claim and unsecured
claim."'150 A creditor whose claim exceeds the value of its collateral
(i.e., the holder of an undersecured claim) actually has two claims: (1) a
secured claim to the extent of the value of its collateral (the allowed
secured claim) and (2) an unsecured claim for the deficiency.' 51 On the
other hand, a creditor whose collateral value exceeds the amount of its
claim has only one claim, an oversecured claim.152 The amount by
which the value of the collateral exceeds the amount of the claim often
is referred to as the "equity cushion" or the "security cushion. '  Pur-
suant to section 506(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, the creditor's security
cushion governs the extent of the creditor's rights to postpetition inter-
est, fees, and charges.' 54
B. Adequate Protection
One of the most significant protections for secured creditors under
the Bankruptcy Code is the concept of adequate protection. A secured
creditor is entitled to adequate protection of its lien in a chapter 11
case. 55 The Bankruptcy Code does not define "adequate protection.'
' 56
Rather, section 361 of the Bankruptcy Code merely gives three exam-
ples of possible forms of adequate protection. 157
In general, the term "adequate protection" means that protection
necessary to preserve the value of a lien at the commencement of the
case throughout the pendency of the case.' 5  The legislative history of
150. Craig H. Averch et al., The Right of Oversecured Creditors to Default Rates of Interest
From a Debtor in Bankruptcy, 47 Bus. LAW. 961, 966 (May 1992) (emphasis in original).
151. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988).
152. Id.
153. United Say. Ass'n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 372
(1988) ("this provision permits postpetition interest to be paid only out of the 'security
cushion' "). See David G. Carlson, Oversecured Creditors Under Bankruptcy Code Section
506(b): The Limits of Postpetition Interest, Attorneys' Fees, and Collection Expenses, 7 BANKR.
DEv. J. 381, 383 (1990).
154. See Kathryn R. Heidt, Interest Under Section 506(b) of the Bankruptcy Code: The Right,
the Rate and the Relationship to Bankruptcy Policy, 1991 UTAH L. REV. 361, 364-65 (1991).
155. 11 U.S.C. § 361 (1988).
156. Bankers Life Ins. Co. of Nebraska v. Alyucan Interstate Corp., 12 B.R. 803, 805 (Bankr.
D. Utah 1981).
157. 11 U.S.C. § 361 (1988).
158. United Say. Ass'n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 793 F.2d 1380,
1389 (5th Cir.), vacated, 802 F.2d 777 (5th Cir. 1986), reinstated on reh 'g en banc, 808 F.2d 363,
364 (5th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 484 U.S. 365 (1988). See also In re Rupprect, 161 B.R. 48, 49-50
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the Bankruptcy Code indicates that the concept of adequate protection
was designed to reconcile the tension between the United States Consti-
tution's prohibition against the taking of property without just compen-
sation 59 and the need in a bankruptcy case to impair the rights and
remedies of a secured creditor.' 60 Based on these comments, courts and
commentators have assumed that adequate protection has constitutional
dimensions.' 6' This assumption is subject to question.' 62 In any event,
a secured creditor is entitled to adequate protection only from decreases
in the value of his collateral due to the pendency of the bankruptcy
case. 163
The Supreme Court's decision in the Timbers case demonstrates
that the interest entitled to adequate protection is the value of the credi-
tor's lien.' 64 For example, suppose the debtor owes the creditor
$1,000,000 on the petition date and the claim is secured by an apartment
complex worth $800,000. In these circumstances, the creditor would be
entitled to adequate protection to ensure that the value of its lien does
not decline below $800,000.
In single-asset realty cases, secured creditors often have security
interests in the bricks, mortar, and personal property of the physical
asset, as well as the revenues generated from the physical asset. With
regard to the physical asset, adequate protection is designed to ensure
that the physical asset does not decrease in value during the pendency of
the case, and to compensate the lender if it does so decrease.
Adequate protection of a security interest in the revenues generated
from the property is a more complicated matter. In real estate cases, the
(Bankr. D. Neb. 1993) (undersecured creditor entitled to adequate protection payments equal to
amount of interest accruing on secured tax claim); In Robbins, 119 B.R. 1, 6 (Bankr. D. Mass.
1990) (accrual of interest on senior mortgage required adequate protection for junior undersecured
creditor).
159. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
160. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 339, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963,
6295.
161. See, e.g., Honorable Stephen A. Stripp, Balancing of Interests in Orders Authorizing the
use of Cash Collateral in Chapter 11, 21 SETON HALL L. REv. 562, 566 (1991) ("The concept of
adequate protection is based on the fifth amendment's command that no private property shall be
taken for public use without just compensation.").
162. See David G. Carlson, Postpetition Interest Under the Bankruptcy Code, 43 U. MIAMi L.
Rav. 577, 585 (1989).
163. The concept of adequate protection protects the creditor against decreases in the value of
its collateral only if the decrease is caused by the pendency of the case. Bankers Life Ins. Co. of
Nebraska v. Alyucan Interstate Corp., 12 B.R. 803, 809 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981) ("Not every
decline in value must be recompensed, only those which, but for the [automatic] stay, could be
and probably would be prevented or mitigated."). See also Honorable Stephen A. Stripp,
Balancing of Interests in Orders Authorizing the Use of Cash Collateral in Chapter 11, 21 SETON
HALL L. REv. 562, 569 n.34 (1991).
164. 484 U.S. at 371.
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debtor often is permitted to use revenues to maintain and operate the
property. The debtor generally provides the lender with adequate pro-
tection by using the revenues pursuant to a budget. The budget gener-
ally provides the requisite adequate protection. 16  In almost all cases,
some maintenance and payment of operating expenses would be neces-
sary, no matter who holds the property, including the secured lender.
Additional adequate protection, therefore, needs to be provided only for
expenses not directly related to maintaining and preserving the real
property and improvements. 166 If neither the property values nor the
rents are declining, the secured party's interests are adequately protected
by preserving the property, which in turn preserves the rental stream.
The concept of adequate protection influences the undersecured
lender's preference as to how the receipt of rents should be treated. A
secured claim is entitled to adequate protection; an unsecured claim is
not.' 67  A lender generally prefers that rents be used to reduce the
unsecured portion of its claim, rather than the secured portion. Best of
all for the lender, however, is the return of collateral view, which does
not reduce the claim at all. The approach that the authors advocate,
however, protects the lender's rights of adequate protection while avoid-
ing a windfall.
C. Postpetition Interest
Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 ("Bankruptcy Act"), 168 creditors
generally were not entitled to postpetition interest.1 69 Several rationales
165. See, e.g., Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Atrium Dev. Co., 159 B.R. 464, 471 (Bankr. E.D.
Va. 1993) ("Adequate protection is typically established by the fact that the cash is being used to
maintain and enhance the value of the underlying income producing real property in which the
creditor also usually holds a security interest."); Fed. Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n v. Dacon Bolingbrook
Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 153 B.R. 204, 214 (N.D Ill. 1993) (required adequate protection satisfied
where rents reinvested "in the operation and maintenance of the property"); In re Ledgemere Land
Corp., 116 B.R. 338, 343 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1990); Chaussee v. Morning Star Ranch Resorts Co.,
64 B.R. 818, 822-23 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1986); Hartigan v. Pine Lake Village Apartment Co., 16
B.R. 750, 756-57 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982).
166. Payment of net rents, after deduction of necessary operating expenses, has been justified
as the equivalent of surcharging one part of the lender's collateral (the gross rents) for expenses in
maintaining the value of another part of the lender's collateral (the real property). See In re
Bloomingdale Partners, 155 B.R. 961, 975 n.8 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1993); In re Vermont Inv. Ltd.
Partnership, 142 B.R. 571, 574 n.4 (Bankr. D.C. 1992); In re Landing Assocs., Ltd., 122 B.R. 288,
297 n.7 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990). See also 11 U.S.C. § 506(c) (1988) (estate can surcharge
collateral for expenses in maintaining it).
167. See David G. Carlson, Postpetition Interest Under the Bankruptcy Code, 43 U. MIAMi L.
Rav. 577, 584, 598 (1989) [hereinafter Carlson, Postpetition Interest].
168. Ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898) (as substantially revised by The Chandler Act of 1938, ch.
575, 52 Stat. 840). The Bankruptcy Act was repealed and superseded by the enactment of the
Bankruptcy Code in 1978.
169. See Nicholas v. United States, 384 U.S. 678, 685 (1966); Vanston Bondholders Protective
Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156, 163 (1946); Sexton v. Dreyfus, 219 U.S. 339, 343-44 (1911);
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supported this rule.' 7 ° First, interest was thought to be a penalty for the
detention of money that should not accrue after the petition date.' 7'
Because the bankruptcy laws, not the debtor, prevented creditors from
collecting their claims after a bankruptcy filing, inequities would likely
result from allowing creditors to collect postpetition interest. 72 Second,
the denial of postpetition interest was a rule of administrative conven-
ience.1 73  Courts considered the date of the bankruptcy filing to be a
convenient date for calculating creditors' claims against a debtor's
estate; the award of postpetition interest would complicate that
calculation. 174
There were exceptions to the general rule. 175 Interest was allowed
where the debtor ultimately proved to be solvent.' 7 6 Interest was also
allowed where the claimant's collateral produced income after the filing
of the bankruptcy petition, in which case the postpetition income could
be applied against postpetition interest on the main claim. 177 Addition-
ally, several courts recognized that secured creditors who held over-
secured claims 7 8 at the time the plan of arrangement was confirmed
were allowed to accrue postpetition interest. 179 In contrast, courts did
not allow undersecured creditors to add postpetition interest to the
amount of their claims.18 0 The primary rationale for this treatment was
that undersecured creditors resembled general unsecured creditors more
Thomas v. Western Car Co., 149 U.S. 95, 116-17 (1893) (filing of bankruptcy petition halts all
interest accrual). See also 3 Collier on Bankruptcy 502.02[2], at 502-29 to -30 (15th ed. 1991).
But see Bankruptcy Act § 63(a)(5). 52 Stat. 873 (repealed 1978) (covering interest accruing
between date of petition and date provable debt was reduced to judgment). See generally Robin
E. Phelan & Stacey Jernigan, Solvent Seems To Be The Hardest Word, NORTON BANKR. L.
ADVISER, Aug. 1991, at 3.
170. Gould, supra note 21, at 1851-52.
171. See American Iron & Steel Mfg. Co. v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 233 U.S. 261, 266-68
(1914).
172. Vanston, 329 U.S. at 164.
173. In re Fesco Plastics Corp., 996 F.2d 152, 155 (7th Cir. 1993).
174. Hanna v. United States, 872 F.2d 829, 830 (8th Cir. 1989).
175. Carlson, Postpetition Interest, supra note 167, at 590-91.
176. See id. at 591 (citing Coder v. Arts, 152 F. 943, 949-50 (8th Cir. 1907), aff'd, 212 U.S.
223 (1909)).
177. See id.
178. Oversecured claims are claims in which the value of the creditor's collateral exceeds the
principal and interest due. See Evan D. Flaschen, Adequate Protection for Oversecured Creditors,
61 AM. BANKR. L.J. 341, 343 (1987).
179. See Carlson, Postpetition Interest, supra note 167, at 591 (citing Sexton v. Dreyfus, 219
U.S. 339 (1911), rev'gln re Kessler & Co., 171 F. 751 (S.D.N.Y. 1909), aff'd, 180 F. 979 (2d
Cir. 1910)).
180. See id. See also, Sexton, 219 U.S. at 344-46 (holding that undersecured parties are
analogous to general unsecured creditors, who are specifically denied postpetition interest under
Bankruptcy Act); United Sav. Ass'n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 793 F.2d
1380, 1381 (5th Cir. 1986), vacated, 802 F.2d 777, reinstated on reh 'g en banc, 808 F.2d 363, 364
(5th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 484 U.S. 365 (1988).
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than they resembled secured creditors.1 8'
Unlike the Bankruptcy Act, the Bankruptcy Code expressly
addresses creditors' rights to postpetition interest.' 82 Section 502(b) of
the Code states that a claim for unmatured interest is not allowable. 8 3
Section 506(b) of the Code, however, states that an oversecured creditor
can receive interest to the extent of its security cushion.'8 4 In addition,
section 726(a)(5) of the Code states that, in a case involving a solvent
Chapter 7 estate, unsecured creditors may receive postpetition inter-
est.' 85 In the context of bankruptcy plans, sections 1129(b), 1225(a)(5),
and 1325(a)(5) of the Code present the parameters for nonconsensual
treatment of secured claims, which include providing for interest to
ensure that the creditor receives the present value of its claim.' 6 Also,
secured claims may be cured and reinstated under sections 1124, 1122,
and 1322 of the Code, and the claims necessarily include the payment of
interest accruing prior to reinstatement.18 7
D. Treatment of Security Interests in Rents and Leases in
Bankruptcy
Against the backdrop of the common law governing interests in
leases and rents, it is no wonder that the overlay of bankruptcy law has
caused additional confusion. Indeed, one of the most litigated and
potentially confusing areas of bankruptcy law involves the determination
of the right of a debtor to use rents from its real property during a bank-
ruptcy case.' Few areas of bankruptcy law have produced the number
of published decisions and commentaries as has the litigation over
whether rents are properly characterized as cash collateral.'8 9 The cases,
181. See generally id.
182. 11 U.S.C. §§ 502(b)(2), 506(b), 726(a)(5), 1129(b), 1225(a)(5), and 1325(a)(5) (1988).
183. It U.S.C. § 502(b)(2) (1988).
184. Id. § 506(b).
185. Id. § 726(a)(5). See also Thompson v. Kentucky Lumber Co., 860 F.2d 674, 676 (6th Cir.
1988); Fed. Say. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Moneymaker, 96 B.R. 287, 290 (C.D. Cal. 1988); Boyer v.
Bernstein, 90 B.R. 200, 201 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1988); Comm'r of Revenue v. Adcom, Inc., 89 B.R. 2
(D. Mass. 1988).
186. II U.S.C. §§ 1129(b), 1225(a)(5), and 1325(a)(5) (1988).
187. Id. §§ 1124, 1122, 1322.
188. Honorable John C. Minahan, Jr., Rents and Profits in Bankruptcy, 27 CREIGHTON L. Rav.
158, 158 (1993); Glenn R. Schmitt, The Continuing Confusion Over Real Property Rents As Cash
Collateral In Bankruptcy: The Need For A Consistent Interpretation, 5 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 1, 2
(1992). It remains to be seen whether the recent amendment to section 552(b) of the Bankruptcy
Code will clarify the issue. See supra note 27.
189. See In re Salmanson, 132 B.R. 547, 551 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1991) (creditor's motion to
prohibit use of cash collateral operated as a Bankruptcy Code-created remedy to perfect its interest
in rents; subsequent foreclosure of property by second lienholder terminated bank's perfected
security interest). Compare First American Bank of Virginia WNB Corp. v. Harbour Pointe Ltd.
Partnership, 132 B.R. 501, 502 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1991); In re Gelwicks, 81 B.R. 445, 448 (Bankr.
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however, should be neither difficult nor complex. Under the common
law principles of property discussed above, a mortgage and/or assign-
ment of rents creates a lien (or in title states, transfers ownership) when
such documents are duly executed by the borrower and recorded in the
appropriate real property records.
Moreover, as previously discussed, a mortgagee's valid lien on the
rents, like many liens, needs judicial enforcement to entitle the mortga-
gee to collect the rents and obtain possessory rights to, or ownership of,
the rents. Under common law principles, the issuance of judicial
enforcement of a mortgagee's lien on the rents may be sufficient to
divest the debtor of all rights in the rents and to vest the possessory right
and ownership of the rents in the mortgagee. 190
In an attempt to blur the issues, debtors in Chapter 11 use the words
"entitlement," "ownership," "right to collect," and "absolute assign-
ment" interchangeably with the words "security interest" and "lien."
The words, however, are not interchangeable and serve only to confuse
N.D. I11. 1987); In re Crabtree, 51 B.R. 521, 526 (Bankr. D. Tenn. 1985); In re Colter, Inc., 46
B.R. 510, 514 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1984), aff'd sub nom. Consol. Capital Income Trust v. Colter,
Inc., 47 B.R. 1008 (D. Colo. 1985); and In re Fluge, 57 B.R. 451,457 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1985) with
Sears Sav. Bank v. Tucson Indus. Partners, 129 B.R. 614, 623-24 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1991), dism "d,
990 F.2d 1099 (9th Cir. 1993) (dismissed as moot because of settlement agreement). The
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel in Tucson Industrial held that under Arizona law, a properly recorded
assignment of rents was the equivalent of a perfected lien and the rents constituted the lender's
cash collateral, even though the lien would be enforceable only if the lender took certain actions
such as appointing a receiver, taking possession of the property, collecting the rents, or obtaining
an injunction. But see Fed. Home Life Ins. Co. v. American Continental Corp., 105 B.R. 564, 573
(Bankr. D. Ariz. 1989) (affirmative postpetition action necessary). Under Georgia law,
bankruptcy courts have held when there exists an assignment of rents separate from the mortgage
on real property, no further action is necessary to perfect the security interest in those rents after a
default has occurred. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 77 B.R. 981, 983 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1987).
Other courts, however, have required postpetition actions. In re Johnson, Wilson and Dillon, 123
B.R. 439, 440-41 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1990). Finally, two recent decisions from the bankruptcy
courts in the Northern District of Georgia have used a mix and match approach to the use of the
terms "collection," "entitlement," and "perfection." See In re Polo Club Apartments Assocs. Ltd.
Partnership, 150 B.R. 840, 850-52 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1993) and In re Keller, 150 B.R. 835 (Bankr.
N.D. Ga. 1993). Both the Polo Club and Keller decisions apparently hold that mortgagees do not
have a perfected security interest in rents unless sufficient prepetition action is taken or an
"appropriate" motion is filed postpetition. A notice under section 546(b) does not count.
190. See, e.g., In re Mount Pleasant Ltd. Partnership, 144 B.R. 727, 734 (Bankr. W.D. Mich.
1992) (prepetition action sufficient to divest debtor of right to the rents); Imperial Gardens
Liquidating Trust v. Northwest Commons, Inc., 136 B.R. 215, 218 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1991)
(same). But see Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Atrium Dev. Co., 159 B.R. 464, 470 (Bankr. E.D.
Va. 1993) (as long as debtor has an "interest" in rents which can be realized by payment of a loan,
rent will be property of the bankruptcy estate). At first glance, the divestiture of a debtor's right to
the rents appears to critically wound the debtor's ability to reorganize under the Bankruptcy Code.
Generally, the prepetition action divesting the debtor from the rents occurs shortly before the
bankruptcy filing. Consequently, the prepetition action which would divest a debtor of ownership
of the rents is a strong candidate for avoidance as a preferential transfer. I I U.S.C. § 547(b)
(1988).
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the issue further.' 9 ' The words "right to collect, .... ownership," and
"entitlement" are applicable only if the court finds that the mortgagee
fully and completely enforced its lien on the rents prior to the filing of
bankruptcy. The "security interest" and "lien" on the rents exists under
common law principles regardless of whether or not the lien was
enforced. 92
E. Timbers of Inwood Forest
In Timbers, the United States Supreme Court held that an under-
secured creditor is not entitled to postpetition interest as compensation
for its lost opportunity costs. 193 In doing so, the Supreme Court clarified
191. See Donahue & Edwards, supra note 7, at 641-42; Patrick A. Randolph, Recognizing
Lenders' Rents Interests In Bankruptcy, 27 REAL PROP., PROB. AND TRUST J. 281 (Summer 1992).
192. See, e.g., Vienna Park Properties v. United Postal Sav. Ass'n, 976 F.2d 106, 112 (2d Cir.
1992) (utilizing Butner to determine if Virginia law is applicable). "Under Virginia law, an
assignment of rents is 'perfected' when it is recorded along with the deed of trust in the land
records." See In re Hall Colttree Assocs., 146 B.R. 675, 677 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1992); In re Park at
Dash Point L.P., 121 B.R. 850, 859 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1990), aff'd, 152 B.R. 300 (W.D. Wash.
1991), aff'd, 958 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir. 1993). The distinction between the right to collect rents and
the existence of a collateral interest in them was also discussed by the United States Bankruptcy
Court for the District of New Hampshire in In re Rancourt, 123 B.R. 143 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1991).
In that case the court held that a creditor's rights in the rents from the debtor's rental property
were an "interest" in property within the meaning of Bankruptcy Code § 363 and "a security
interest [that] extends to ... rents ... to the extent provided by [the] security agreement and by
applicable nonbankruptcy law" under Bankruptcy Code § 552(b). Id. at 148. The court stated that
it could "see no principled way to support a ruling that the mortgagees involved in the present
matter have no 'cash collateral' security interest in rents, simply because prebankruptcy they did
not have any effectuated rights to collect specific rent payments." Id. (emphasis in original).
193. United States Sav. Ass'n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365,
382 (1988). The considerable commentary before and after the Timbers decision includes the
following: H. Miles Cohn, Protecting Secured Creditors Against the Costs of Delay in
Bankruptcy: Timbers of Inwood Forest and Its Aftermath, 6 BANKR. DEV. J. 147 (1989); Carlos J.
Cuevas, Lost Compensation Costs and the Undersecured Creditor: A Journey Into the Inwood
Forest, 33 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1 (1988); Richard A. Marshack, Adequate Protection for the
Undersecured Creditor Under the Bankruptcy Code, 88 COM. L.J. 621 (1983); Raymond T.
Nimmer, Secured Creditors and the Automatic Stay: Variable Bargain Models of Fairness, 68
MINN. L. REV. 1 (1983); Joseph U. Schorer, The Right of the Undersecured Creditor to
Postpetition Interest in Bankruptcy on the Value of Its Collateral: Implications of Recent Cases,
21 U.C.C. L.J. 61 (1988); Tazewell T. Shepard III, The Plight of Secured Creditors After In re
Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd., 94 CoM. L.J. 26 (1989); Richard B. Webber II,
Adequate Protection and the Undersecured Creditor: United Savings Association of Texas v.
Timbers of Inwood Forest, Assocs., 41 OKLA. L. REv. 637 (1988); Note, "Adequate Protection "
and the Availability of Postpetition Interest to Undersecured Creditors in Bankruptcy, 100 HARM.
L. REV. 1106 (1987); J. Kevin Bird, Note, Adequate Protection of Time Value for Undersecured
Creditors During the Automatic Stay in Bankruptcy: Where Are We After American Mariner?, 2
BANKR. DEV. J. 341 (1985); Frances F. Gecker, Comment, The Recovery of Opportunity Costs as
Just Compensation: A Takings Analysis of Adequate Protection, 81 N.W.U.L. REv. 953 (1987);
Chris Juravich, Note, In Re Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates: Lost Opportunity Cost
Uncompensable Under the Automatic Stay Provision for Adequate Protection, 24 Hous. L. REV.
801 (1987); Thomas 0. Kelly III, Comment, Compensation for Time Value as Part of Adequate
Protection During the Automatic Stay in Bankruptcy, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 305 (1983); Daniel J.
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the rights of secured creditors in bankruptcy cases. First, the Supreme
Court defined the secured creditor's "interest in property" as that phrase
is used in section 506(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.1 94 In interpreting sec-
tion 506(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, the Supreme Court stated that "the
creditor's 'interest in property' obviously means his security interest
without taking account of his right to immediate possession of the collat-
eral on default."'' 9 The Supreme Court then stated that the " 'value of
such creditor's interest' in § 506(a) means the 'value of the collat-
eral.' ",196 The Supreme Court held that similar language with respect to
adequate protection of an "interest in property" in section 361 of the
Bankruptcy Code had the same meaning. 197
An undersecured creditor, therefore, is not entitled to postpetition
interest on the value of the collateral. Pointing to the general rule disal-
lowing such interest to unsecured creditors, the Court concluded that
providing an undersecured creditor with interest on the value of its col-
lateral would violate the general prohibition against the payment of
postpetition interest to unsecured creditors.' 98 Only a decrease in the
value of the collateral entitled an undersecured creditor to adequate pro-
tection. 199 In sum, the Supreme Court's decision in Timbers means that
an undersecured creditor is not entitled to compensation for the loss of
the time-value of its collateral-whether that compensation is character-
ized as "interest" or "adequate protection." 2" This does not, however,
mean that an undersecured creditor is never entitled to adequate protec-
tion payments. Certainly, if the value of the property decreases, the
secured creditor would be entitled to adequate protection.2 °'
F. Case Law Distinguishing Timbers
The bankruptcy court in Timbers refused to rule on whether net
rents received by the undersecured creditor could be credited against
postpetition interest obligations.202 Consequently, the Supreme Court in
Warren, Comment, Lost Opportunity Costs as a Measure of Adequate Protection: The Sinking of
American Mariner?, 4 BANKR. DEv. J. 477 (1987).
194. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988).
195. 484 U.S. at 372.
196. Id. (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 181, 356 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 6141, 6312).
197. Id.
198. Id. at 373.
199. Id. at 370.
200. Id.
201. 11 U.S.C. § 361(a) (1988).
202. Republic Bank Houston v. Bear Creek Ministorage, Inc., 49 B.R. 454, 460 (Bankr. S.D.
Tex. 1985), aff'd sub nom. United Sav. Assn. of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd.,
793 F.2d 1380, aff'd en banc, 808 F.2d 363 (5th Cir.) aff'd, 484 U.S. 365 (1988).
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Timbers never squarely addressed the issue of an undersecured credi-
tors' entitlement to postpetition interest from encumbered net rents.20 3
In In re Birdneck Apartment Associates, II, L.P.,2  the bankruptcy
court concluded that Timbers did not address the treatment of net rents
in bankruptcy cases.2 °5 In Birdneck, the debtor's sole asset was a 100-
unit apartment complex located in Virginia Beach, Virginia. 0 6 Potomac
Equity Portfolio Partnership, L.P. ("Potomac") was secured by a deed of
trust on the property and a security interest in all revenues.20 7 Potomac,
which was an undersecured creditor, was owed approximately
$3,051,000, and its collateral was valued at $2,900,000. The property
was also encumbered with a first priority tax lien in the amount of
$153,000.
Potomac's unsecured deficiency claim was large enough to give
Potomac control of the class of unsecured claims, and Potomac voted to
reject the plan. The debtor argued that Potomac did not have an
unsecured claim because Potomac received postpetition payments total-
ling $438,191.57 pursuant to a cash collateral order, and these payments
should have been applied to reduce principal instead of interest.2 08
Alternatively, the debtor contended that the postpetition payments
should be added to the value of the collateral, thus making Potomac an
oversecured creditor.20 9 The court rejected both alternatives.
First, the Birdneck court emphasized that the debtor's reliance on
Timbers was misplaced because Timbers merely "prohibits payments to
undersecured creditors only from 'unencumbered' assets where there is
no evidence of decline in collateral value. 210 Because Potomac had a
valid perfected security interest in revenues, the revenues were Poto-
mac's cash collateral and Timbers would not prohibit postpetition pay-
ments from cash collateral. 11
Second, the court noted that pursuant to a cash collateral order, the
debtor was permitted to use cash collateral to pay operating expenses
only because (1) the debtor was making monthly payments pursuant to
the terms of the prepetition loan documents and (2) Potomac was
granted a lien on all postpetition revenues.21 2 In a footnote, the court
stated that:
203. Carlson, Adequate Protection, supra note 14, at 1370-71.
204. 156 B.R. 499 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1993).
205. Id. at 505.
206. Id. at 502.
207. Id. at 501.
208. Id. at 505.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
[Vol. 48:691
NET RENTS IN BANKRUPTCY
In cash collateral and relief from stay litigation when there is little or
no equity in the subject collateral, this court often denies the creditor
relief conditioned upon the chapter 11 debtor maintaining interest
current on the debt as a form of adequate protection. To allow chap-
ter 11 debtors to recharacterize this relief at confirmation would be
contrary to the court's intention and wholly inequitable to the secured
creditor.21 3
Third, the Birdneck court recognized that even if the payments
were properly characterized as "additional collateral value," this value
would be offset by Potomac's increased claim resulting from the accrual
of interest under section 506(b) of the Bankruptcy Code.2 14 Based on
this analysis, the Birdneck court concluded that the result would be a
"wash," and, therefore, a reduction in Potomac's secured claim would be
inappropriate.215
The essence of the Birdneck decision is the court's analysis of the
Timbers decision. The Birdneck court is correct that Timbers did not
address whether a secured creditor is entitled to postpetition payments
from its collateral. The court's justification for its decision, however, is
subject to criticism. The court failed to explain why a debtor should be
required to make current interest payments as a form of adequate
protection.
The real question presented by Birdneck is what is the proper form
of adequate protection for the use of net rents. For example, suppose
instead of paying the net rents to the lender, the debtor used the net
rents. Arguably, the amount of the creditor's secured claim would be
increased by the amount of the net rents that are not paid to the lender.
On the other hand, if the debtor was to pay the net rents to the lender, the
amount of the secured lender's claim arguably should be reduced to the
extent it receives these payments.
The Birdneck court's analysis depends upon whether the creditor
had a right to postpetition interest. The court concluded that the creditor
had a right to postpetition interest under section 506(b) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code. The court, however, failed to explain how the creditor
could be oversecured given that the value of the collateral as only
$2,900,000 and the creditor was owed $3,051,000.
Other courts have also concluded that Timbers does not address the
treatment of net rents. In Unsecured Creditors' Committee v. Jones
Truck Lines, Inc.,216 the cash collateral order granted the prepetition
213. Id.
214. Id. at 506.
215. Id.
216. 156 B.R. 608 (W.D. Ark. 1992).
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lender additional "adequate protection" for the use of its cash collateral
in the form of postpetition interest payments. The unsecured creditors'
committee argued that the lender was undersecured and, therefore, not
entitled to postpetition interest. Specifically, the committee argued that
the "cash collateral represents, in essence, an old pre-petition loan, not a
post-petition advance, and the bank therefore is earning post-petition
interest on a pre-petition debt. 217
On the other hand, the lender argued that it was not receiving
postpetition interest on prepetition debt in violation of Timbers, but
rather was receiving postpetition interest on postpetition advances in the
form of cash collateral.2 8 In essence, the lender contended that it was
entitled to postpetition interest because the use of cash collateral consti-
tuted a new loan or cash advance. Based on this rationale, the lender
contended that it was entitled to receive postpetition interest because the
money being used would otherwise be paid to the bank.2 19
The district court agreed with the lender. The court noted that
"Timbers did not address whether a post-petition grant of cash collateral
based on pre-petition debt may earn post-petition interest."22 The court
agreed with the lender that granting the use of cash collateral could be
deemed to be a postpetition loan that could include the accrual of
interest.22 '
This analysis is subject to criticism, because the court failed to
appreciate the distinction between use of cash collateral and the making
of a new loan.222
G. Summary: Distinguishing Rents, Adequate Protection, and
Interest
On a basic level, "rents," "adequate protection payments," and
"interest" are all the same. That is, all relate to the use of property.
223
Indeed, all three types of payments serve to allocate risks. Interest is
charged to cover the risk associated with (i) the failure of the debtor to
pay the loan, and (ii) the failure of the collateral to cover the loss associ-
217. Id. at 613.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. David A. Warfield, Is it Use of Cash Collateral or Post-Petition Borrowing: How Much
Protection Does the Creditor Deserve?, 94 COMM. L.J. 369, 374 (1989).
223. Carlson, Postpetition Interest, supra note 167, at 607 ("At the appropriate levels of
generality, all things are the same or all things are different .... Rent is to property what interest
is to money - both are charges for use.").
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ated with a defaulted loan.22 4 Adequate protection addresses the risk of
loss of collateral value after a bankruptcy case is commenced.225 Rents
provide the cash flow to service the loan. The leases generating the cash
flow have a risk of nonperformance that attaches to the rents.226
There are, however, significant differences between the treatment
of interest, rents, and adequate protection payments under the Bank-
ruptcy Code. For example, courts have discretion over grants of ade-
quate protection 227  and whether rents are characterized as cash
collateral. 228 Interest, on the other hand, is mandated when the creditor
is oversecured 229 and generally disallowed when the creditor is under-
secured.23° Another difference between these three types of payments is
that interest does not reduce the principal amount of the debt, while
receipt of adequate protection payments or net rents may do so.
H. Valuing the Collateral
1. OVERVIEW
The concepts governing valuations of real estate are simple to state,
but difficult to apply.23 ' Generally, a bankruptcy court will entertain
testimony from experts who appraise property based on estimates and
approximations.232 Approaching valuation as a pure fact issue, however,
misses an important point.233 Judgments about value should consider
which party would bear the risk of an erroneous valuation.234 While
necessarily referring to the factual evidence presented, valuation choices
should be resolved in light of the practical effect of the valuation.235
224. See Craig H. Averch et al., The Right of Oversecured Creditors to Default Rates of
Interest from a Debtor in Bankruptcy, 47 Bus. LAW. 961, 979 (May 1992).
225. See, e.g., In re Camellia Court Apartments, Ltd., 117 B.R. 316, 319 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
1990) (declining to provide adequate protection where collateral value was stable).
226. STEPHEN A. PHYRR & JAMES R. COOPER, REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT 632-37 (1982).
227. 11 U.S.C. § 361 (1988).
228. Specifically, section 552(b) of the Bankruptcy Code allows a court to eliminate an
encumbrance on rents "based on the equities of the case." See Collier on Bankruptcy 1 552 at 552
(15th ed. 1993).
229. il U.S.C. § 506(b) (1988).
230. Timbers, 484 U.S. at 370-73.
231. See Craig H. Averch & Michael J. Collins, Avoidance of Foreclosure Sales as
Preferential Transfers: Another Serious Threat to Secured Creditors?, 24 TEX. TECH L. REV.
985, 1017-25 (1993) (examining real property valuation under section 547(b)(5)).
232. Raymond T. Nimmer, Secured Claims in Reorganization Plans 6 (1992) (unpublished
manuscript on file with author) ("No single or true market value exists. The search for such value
is a search doomed to failure.").
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
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Section 506(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, which governs valuations
of secured claims in bankruptcy cases, states:
(a) An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on prop-
erty in which the estate has an interest, or that is subject to setoff
under section 553 of this title, is a secured claim to the extent of the
value of such creditor's interest in the estate's interest in such prop-
erty, or to the extent of the amount subject to setoff, as the case may
be, and is an unsecured claim to the extent that the value of such
creditor's interest or the amount so subject to setoff is less than the
amount of such allowed claim. Such value shall be determined in
light of the purpose of the valuation and of the proposed disposition
or use of such property, and in conjunction with any hearing on such
disposition or use or on a plan affecting such creditor's interest. 236
In pertinent part, the legislative history of section 506(a) states that
"[w]hile courts will have to determine value on a case-by-case basis, the
subsection makes it clear that valuation is to be determined in light of
the purpose of the valuation and the proposed disposition or use of the
subject property. '237
Congress gave no guidance concerning the valuation standard to be
used by the bankruptcy courts. Not surprisingly, bankruptcy courts have
used a variety of methods for calculating value, (e.g., fair market value,
retail value, going concern value, or wholesale value).2 38 The method
for calculating value may also depend, at least in part, on the purpose for
which the valuation is made.239 The uncertainty that the parties face
when placing valuation issues in the hands of the bankruptcy court often
will result in the parties reaching agreement without court intervention.
There is further flexibility in terms of the setting in which such a
valuation is performed, e.g., (i) at a hearing on relief from the automatic
stay, which may also involve a demand for adequate protection; (ii) at a
hearing in which a debtor in possession proposes to sell, use, or other-
wise dispose of collateral other than under a plan of reorganization; or
(iii) at a confirmation hearing to consider a plan of reorganization that
may affect a creditor's interest in collateral. The case-by-case approach
has not yielded a clear standard. In general, however, the bankruptcy
courts, have tended to disfavor a "liquidation" standard, which incorpo-
rates a forced-sale or quick-sale valuation.24° Courts have generally
236. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988).
237. S. Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 68 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787,
5854.
238. James F. Queenan, Jr., Standards for Valuation of Security Interests in Chapter 11, 92
COM. L.J. 18, 19-20 (1987).
239. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988).
240. See, e.g., In re Crowthers McCall Pattern, Inc., 120 B.R. 279, 299-301 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1990).
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concluded that unless the debtor is on its financial deathbed, the debtor's
assets should be valued at their going concern value for purposes of
determining whether the debtor was insolvent.241
"As Justice Brandeis once observed, '[v]alue is a word of many
meanings.' "242 The uncertainty associated with the concept of "value"
has been the subject of numerous judicial opinions and scholarly com-
mentaries. For example, Judge Jerome Frank stated:
The fallacy in that argument stems largely from lack of recognition of
the eely character of the word 'value.' It is a bewitching word which,
for years, has disturbed mental peace and caused numerous useless
debates. Perhaps it would be better for [peace of mind] if the word
were abolished. Reams of good paper and gallons of good ink have
been wasted by those who have tried to give it a constant and precise
meaning.243
2. THE DATE OF VALUATION
Section 506 of the Bankruptcy Code does not establish the date as
of which the value of collateral should be determined. 2 4 There are three
views concerning the date for valuing a secured creditor's collateral.
For adequate protection purposes, some courts conclude that the petition
date is the applicable point in time for valuation of collateral.245 Other
courts hold that collateral should be valued as of the date of the hear-ing.246 Still other courts state that the collateral should be valued as of
the effective date of the plan of reorganization.24 7
In determining the effect of receipt of net rents by an undersecured
creditor, the timing of the valuation of the secured claim under section
241. See Moody v. Security Pac. Business Credit, Inc., 971 F.2d 1056, 1067 (3d Cir. 1992); In
re Taxman Clothing Co., 905 F.2d 166, 170 (7th Cir. 1990).
242. Bundles v. Baker, 856 F.2d 815, 823 (7th Cir. 1988) (quoting Missouri ex rel.
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 276, 310 (1923) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring)).
243. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Marshall, 125 F.2d 943, 946 (2d Cir. 1942).
244. See David G. Carlson, Time, Value, and the Rights of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy,
or, When Does Adequate Protection Begin?, I J. BANKR. L. & PAc. 113 (1991); Patrick
Fitzgerald, Comment, Bankruptcy Code Section 506(a) and Undersecured Creditors: What Date
for Valuation?, 34 UCLA L. REv. 1953, 1955 (1987).
245. Westchase I Assocs., L.P. v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 126 B.R. 692, 694 (Bankr.
W.D.N.C. 1991); In re Beard, 108 B.R. 322, 324 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1989). Chrysler Credit Corp.
v. Van Nort, 9 B.R. 218, 221-22 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1981); In re Adams, 2 B.R. 313, 314 (Bankr.
M.D. Fla. 1980).
246. Blakey v. Pierce, 76 B.R. 465, 468 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987) (following 3 Collier on
Bankruptcy, 506.04, at 506-37 (15th Ed. Rev. 1989)).
247. In re Cook, 38 B.R. 870, 872 (Bankr. D. Utah 1984); Ahlers v. Norwest Bank
Worthington, 794 F.2d 388, 398-99 (8th Cir. 1986), rev'd on other grounds, 485 U.S. 197 (1988).
In re Seip, 116 B.R. 709, 710-11 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1990); In re Landing Assocs., Ltd., 122 B.R.
288, 292 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990).
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506(a) of the Bankruptcy Code may be determinative. If the value of the
"secured claim" is determined as of the petition date, arguably the
postpetition net rent is not, by definition, part of the secured claim. 24
8
In Dewsnup v. Timm,249 the Supreme Court addressed the issue of
valuation as a moving target during the pendency of a bankruptcy
case.250 In Dewsnup, the Supreme Court held that a debtor in a Chapter
7 case could not limit an allowed secured claim to the petition date col-
lateral value under section 506(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.25" ' The
Supreme Court observed that any increase over the judicially determined
valuation during bankruptcy accrues to the benefit of the secured credi-
tor, not to the benefit of the bankruptcy estate.252 Dewsnup, however,
does not satisfactorily answer the issue at hand because the actual value
of the collateral does not change simply through the accrual of postpeti-
tion net rents.2 53
3. THE INCOME APPROACH TO VALUATION
In general, the principles governing the valuation of income-pro-
ducing real property are settled. 254  When valuing income-producing
property, appraisers often use the "cost approach," the "sales compari-
son approach," and the "income capitalization approach. 2 55  The
"income capitalization approach" is considered by some appraisers to be
the most reliable. 56
Under the income capitalization approach, the value of the property
is a function of its ability to generate an income stream in the future.
25 7
248. This argument, however, misses an important point. As discussed infra, the "income
approach" to valuation includes the capitalization of future income. Postpetition rents, therefore,
are included in the valuation. See Leslie K. Beckhart, No Intrinsic Value: The Failure of
Traditional Real Estate Appraisal Methods to Value Income-Producing Property, 66 S. CAL. L.
Rav. 2251, 2273 (1993).
249. 112 S. Ct. 773 (1992).
250. Id. at 778.
251. Id.
252. Id. (the increase in the value of property "during bankruptcy rightly accrues to the benefit
of the creditor, not to the benefit of the debtor and not to the benefit of other unsecured creditors
whose claims have been allowed and who had nothing to do with the mortgagor-mortgagee
bargain").
253. For purposes of this Article, it is assumed that the property is properly maintained,
necessary capital improvements are made, and the market is stable.
254. See In re Vienna Park Properties, 132 B.R. 517, 519 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991).
255. Id.
256. Id. But see Leslie K. Beckhart, No Intrinsic Value: The Failure of Traditional Real
Estate Appraisal Methods to Value Income-Producing Property, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 2251, 2273-
78 (1993).
257. APPRAISAL INSTITUTE OF REAL ESTATE APPRAISERS, THE APPRAISAL OF REAL ESTATE,
71-72 (10th ed. 1992).
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In essence, a two-step inquiry is made. 25 8 First, the appraiser projects
the level of income that the property will produce for the foreseeable
future and totals the amount.25 9 This amount is then discounted by
applying an appropriate discount rate to determine what a willing buyer
would pay a willing seller today for the opportunity to receive the
income stream as it accrues.260
The capitalization of income is the process of translating net annual
income into an expression of capital worth. The basic formula of most
capitalization methods is to divide net annual income by rate of
return.26 1 The two most important factors in capitalization are the selec-
tion of the appropriate capitalization rate and the capitalization tech-
nique to be used. The unique characteristics of the property and the
actions of the market determine both the capitalization rate and the most
suitable technique.262
Yield capitalization is a method used to convert future benefits or
cash flows into a present worth, based on a required level of profit or
rate of return on invested capital. This method is profit or yield ori-
ented.2 63 It is intended to simulate the typical investor's requirements by
calculating the present worth of an anticipated future income stream
according to a presumed requirement of profit or yield.216 The conver-
sion of the future benefits or cash flows at the specified yield rate (dis-
count rate) is referred to as discounting when used in this analytical
procedure.
The discounting procedure is based on the time value of money
(i.e., a dollar received today is worth more than a dollar received in the
future). The rate that compensates investors to hold an investment is
based on a satisfactory yield or rate of return on the investment plus a
complete recovery of the initial capital invested.265 The rate of return or
yield rate varies with the degree of risk involved in a project and the
market, as well as by individual investor's preferences.
In yield capitalization by discounted cash flow analysis, a holding
period is selected first. Then all future cash flows, or patterns and rela-
tionships between present and future cash flows, are identified (includ-
ing the sale of the property at the end of the holding period). Next, an
appropriate discount rate (yield rate) is selected. Finally, the future cash
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 408-428.
262. Id. at 414-19.
263. Id. at 415-16.
264. id. at 413.
265. Id. at 416-17.
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flow is converted into value by discounting and combining each annual
future benefit and the reversion.266
In certain situations, adjustments are then made to the appraised
value of the property to take into account such factors as changes in
market conditions, the condition of the property, and the cost of
261repairs.
4. APPLICATION OF VALUATION PRINCIPLES IN DETERMINING THE
SECURED CLAIM
a. The Approach in Landing Associates
Nowhere are valuation principles more difficult to apply than in
determining the amount of the secured claim under section 506(a) of the
Bankruptcy Code.268 This difficulty is exemplified in In re Landing
Associates, Ltd.269
In Landing Associates, the debtor owned a 216-unit apartment
complex located in San Antonio, Texas. United Savings Association of
Texas, FSB ("United Savings") held a lien on the real property and the
revenues generated therefrom.270 On May 2, 1989, the debtor filed its
Chapter 11 petition.27' On May 26, 1989, United Savings filed its
"Notice of Perfection of Security Interest in Rents in Lieu of Seizure of
Property or Commencement of Action" under section 546(b).2 72 United
Savings filed a proof of claim alleging that it was owed $5,242,988.81
on the petition date. United Savings also claimed that interest was
accruing at the per diem contract rate of $2,378.95."3
The debtor filed a motion requesting the bankruptcy court to deter-
mine the allowed amount of United Savings's secured claim. The debtor
contended that the hypothetical costs of liquidation should be deducted
from the value of the property. The debtor also argued that United Sav-
ings's interests in the rents should not be valued separately from the real
estate because the value of the rents was subsumed in the value of the
real property. Third, the debtor contended that the collateral should be
valued as of the petition date. Finally, the debtor argued that because
United Savings was an undersecured creditor and its collateral was not
declining in value, United Savings was not entitled to receive the net
266. Id. at 421.
267. In re Vienna Park Properties, 132 B.R. 517, 520 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991).
268. See David G. Carlson, Secured Creditors and the Eely Character of Bankruptcy
Valuations, 41 Am. U. L. Rv. 63, 78-79 (1991).
269. 122 B.R. 288 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990).
270. Id. at 290.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 290-91.
273. Id. at 291.
[Vol. 48:691
NET RENTS IN BANKRUPTCY
rents as adequate protection.274
United Savings, on the other hand, argued that its interest in the
rents should be separate and apart from the real property that generated
the rents.275 The Landing Associates court agreed with this position.276
First, the court noted that although United Savings was owed only
one debt, it held three items of collateral: a deed of trust on real prop-
erty; an assignment of rents; and a security interest in personal prop-
erty.2 77 The court rejected the debtor's argument that the interests in
rents had no value even though it was subsumed into the value of the
real property. The court reasoned that a deed of trust entitles a creditor
to foreclose on real property and become the owner. After becoming the
owner of the real property, the creditor would be entitled to the rents
generated from the property. According to the Landing Associates
court, the assignment of rents gives the creditor the added right to take
possession of the rents upon default and before foreclosure. The court
then stated that:
When a debtor files bankruptcy, the automatic stay prevents the
lender holding this bundle of rights from enjoying them. The rents
collected post-petition are presumed to be rents which, but for the
bankruptcy, would have been collected by the lender under its assign-
ment of rents. A lender with only a deed of trust lacks the extra
bundle of rights which would permit it to benefit from the operation
of Section 552(b), i.e., a lender, by virtue of its deed of trust alone,
could not collect rents prior to foreclosure. Just as we afford ade-
quate protection to a lender with a mere deed of trust as though it
would have foreclosed on the property and enjoyed the full benefits
of its deed of trust as of the filing date but for the bankruptcy filing,
we similarly afford adequate protection to the secured creditor with
an assignments of rents .... Thus an assignment of rents confers
rights which have discrete value apart from the underlying deed of
trust interest in the real property generating those rents.278
The essence of the Landing Associates court's analysis is the state-
ment that the "income approach more precisely values the ability to pro-
duce income, rather than the income itself.' ' 279 In pertinent part, the
court states that:
What appraisers are valuing (or predicting) is what someone would
be willing to pay to own the property and enjoy its fruits. The
income approach measures the ability of the property to produce a
274. Id.
275. Id. at 296.
276. Id.
277. Id,
278. Id. (emphasis in original).
279. Id. at 297 (emphasis in original).
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return on investment (via an income stream) that would justify a
buyer's paying the indicated market value to own the property. The
right to specific rents prior to ownership of the property conferred by
an assignment of rents, is a priori not calculated into this value.2 81
Landing Associates makes a point that is often overlooked. The
"fair market value" of the property under the income approach to valua-
tion measures a hypothetical individual investor's value.281 The
"estate's interest" measured under section 506(a) includes the "fair mar-
ket value" plus the net rents accruing until the sale of the property.
Absent material changes in the real estate market, interest rates, or other
factors that affect investment decisions, the "fair market value" of the
property should remain fairly constant. The investment value, therefore,
is the same. The ownership value or "estate's interest," however,
includes the receipt of net rents - which is not considered in determin-
ing market value.
The analysis in Landing Associates is not flawless. For example,
Landing Associates appears to bifurcate the secured creditor's claim into
separate interests, one conferred by a deed of trust and the other con-
ferred by an assignment of rents.282 By creating the two separate secur-
ity interests, Landing Associates blurs the obvious point. Although
"market value" includes the future rents, market value measures the
investor's interest and not the owner's (or estate's) interest which is sub-
ject to a security interest.
b. The Market Value Approach
The straight market value approach to valuation differs from that
used in Landing Associates. Under a straight market value approach, the
collateral of the undersecured creditor does not grow simply by the reali-
zation of the expected income derived from the property. For example,
if the income-producing real property in question has a value of $1 mil-
lion on the petition date, that value is based on a present-value calcula-
tion of the future cash flow from the property. The actual accrual of the
future rents should not change the value of the property and, therefore,
the value of the secured claim should not change. Thus, the accrual of
net rents can be characterized as merely the realization of what was
expected and valued as of the petition date.
Arguably, the capitalization of future income does not correctly
280. Id. (emphasis in original).
281. Id. at 296-97.
282. Id. at 297 ("The appraisals only valued the interest conferred by USAT's deed of trust.
They did not purport to value the wholly separate interest conferred by USAT's assignment of
rents .... ").
[Vol. 48:691
NET RENTS IN BANKRUPTCY
value the secured claim as of the petition date. The fair market value of
the property cannot be determined unless the net rents from the petition
date to "closing" were included. Fair market value usually measures
what a willing buyer would pay a willing seller, with no compulsion to
buy or sell, as of a specific date.283
A willing buyer purchasing the property on the petition date for fair
market value would receive the net rents accruing thereafter. The
secured creditor would receive the value of its "secured claim" on the
petition date.
The lack of existence of a petition date sale requires a reevaluation
of what a willing buyer would pay a willing seller on the petition date.
Since the willing buyer cannot acquire the property until closing (which
would occur sometime after the petition date), the willing buyer tender-
ing the fair market value purchase price on the petition date must expect
to receive the postpetition rents through closing. Otherwise, the
purchase price would be reduced. Thus, the fair market value of the
property as of the petition date is erroneous, unless provision is made for
the inclusion of postpetition rents.
The value of the secured claim determined under section 506(a) of
the Bankruptcy Code includes encumbered postpetition net rent and,
therefore, the value of the "secured claim" is increased by the net rent
regardless of the appraised value of the property. This argument, how-
ever, misses another point. An undersecured creditor cannot be entitled
to both the net rents as part of its secured claim and postpetition interest
on its secured claim. By definition, there is not enough net rent to pay
interest and increase the secured claim.
V. ANALYSIS
A. Statutory Construction
1. PLAIN LANGUAGE
The United States Supreme Court has clarified the analysis that
courts generally should apply when interpreting the Bankruptcy Code.28 4
283. See Chaim J. Fortgang & Thomas M. Mayer, Valuation In Bankruptcy, 32 UCLA L. REV.
1061 (1985); Steven L. Pottle, Note, Bankruptcy Valuation Under Selected Liquidation
Provisions, 40 VAND. L. Rav. 177, 183 (1987).
284. See generally Peter H. Carroll, III, Literalism: The United States Supreme Court's
Methodology for Statutory Construction in Bankruptcy Cases, 25 ST. MARY'S L.J. 143 (1993);
Robert K. Rasmussen, A Study of the Costs and Benefits Of Textualism: The Supreme Court's
Bankruptcy Cases, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 535 (1993); Walter A. Effross, Grammarians at the Gate:
The Rehnquist's Court's Evolving "Plain Meaning" Approach to Bankruptcy Jurisprudence, 23
SETON HALL L. REV. 1636 (1993); Charles J. Tabb & Robert M. Lawless, Of Commas, Gerunds,
and Conjunctions: The Bankruptcy Jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Court, 42 SYRACUSE L. REv.
823 (1991).
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Questions concerning the proper interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code
should be resolved by reference to its " 'text, history, and purpose.' ",285
Because the language of the Bankruptcy Code should be dispositive,28 6 a
bankruptcy court should look first to the statutory language and then to
the legislative history if the statutory language is unclear.28 7 In addition,
the Supreme Court has emphasized that the plain meaning of the Bank-
ruptcy Code should be controlling in issues of statutory interpretation,
except in the " 'rare cases [in which] the literal application of a statute
will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its
drafters.' "288 Courts, therefore, should depart from the strict language
of a section of the Bankruptcy Code only if the language is unclear,
ambiguous, or clearly contrary to the Bankruptcy Code's purpose and
history.289
Because of its view that overemphasis on legislative materials
might lead to a distorted view of statutory purpose, the Supreme Court
fashioned these interpretive rules with an emphasis on strict textual con-
struction.29 ° With respect to the Bankruptcy Code in particular, the
Supreme Court has cautioned:
[I]n such a substantial overhaul of the system, it is not appropriate or
realistic to expect Congress to have explained with particularity each
step it took. Rather, as long as the statutory scheme is coherent and
consistent, there is generally no need for a court to inquire beyond the
plain language of the statute.29'
The Supreme Court's position on statutory interpretation does not
imply that extrinsic aids, such as legislative history, prior law, and pol-
icy analyses are irrelevant in all cases. These aids are useful for deter-
mining whether the plain language reflects Congress's true intent in
285. Johnson v. Home State Bank, 111 S. Ct. 2150, 2153 (1991) (quoting Farrey v. Sanderfoot,
111 S. Ct. 1825, 1830 (1991)).
286. See id. at 2155.
287. Id.
288. United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989) (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic
Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982)). See also Adam J. Wiensch, Comment, The Supreme
Court, Textualism, and the Treatment of Pre-Bankruptcy Code Law, 79 GEO. L.J. 1831, 1832-34
(1991) (examining and supporting Supreme Court's Textualist approach to interpretation of
Bankruptcy Code). But cf Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773, 778 (1992) (finding phrase
"allowed secured claim" ambiguous and not tied to definitions in other sections of Bankruptcy
Code.).
289. See In re Continental Airlines, Inc., 932 F.2d 282, 287 (3d Cir. 1991).
290. See Paskel v. Heckler, 768 F.2d 540, 544 (3d Cir. 1985) ("[M]uch less thought is spent on
the future implications of committee reports and explanations on the floor than in choosing the
words of a statute.") (quoting Archibald Cox, Judge Learned Hand and the Interpretation of
Statutes, 60 HARv. L. REv. 370, 381 (1947)).
291. 932 F.2d at 287 (quoting United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240-41
(1989)).
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enacting the statute.292 Of course, where the statutory language is less
than clear, extrinsic aids may be essential. When the statutory language
is clear on its face, however, "a party seeking to counter that language
must produce other evidence that exhibits at least as much clarity. '291
The plain language doctrine is not a panacea in resolving disputes
arising under the Bankruptcy Code. Apparently, the "plain language" is
what five United States Supreme Court justices consider it to be even if
it is the opposite of what the other four justices considered it to be.294
Moreover, the source for the interpretation of the "plain language" is
subject to debate among the current justices.295
The Bankruptcy Code does not contain a provision dictating the
characterization or application of net rents received by an undersecured
creditor. Consequently, other nonspecific provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code must be examined.
2. THE INTERRELATIONSHIP OF SECTIONS OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
ON THE RECEIPT OF NET RENTS
The Supreme Court has instructed the bench and bar that bank-
ruptcy laws cannot be read "with the ease of a computer. '296 In fact, the
Court has emphasized that a "holistic" approach should be employed
when interpreting the Bankruptcy Code.297 As a consequence, courts
should give effect to the differences in the statutory language among the
various sections of the Bankruptcy Code.
Section 506(a) of the Bankruptcy Code governs the amount and
value of a secured claim.298 Section 552(b) contemplates that a secured
creditor may (if the court decides not to exercise its equitable discre-
tion),299 increase its secured claim by the accrual of postpetition rents.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. See, e.g., United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235 (1989) (five-to-four
decision).
295. Compare Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 113 S. Ct. 1489,
1494-95 (1993) (relying on Webster's Dictionary) with Rake v. Wade, 113 S. Ct. 2187, 2192
(1993) (unanimously relying on the American Heritage Dictionary) and United States Dep't of
Treasury v. Fabe, 113 S. Ct. 2202, 2210 (1993) (relying in part on Black's Law Dictionary).
296. Bank of Main v. England, 385 U.S. 99, 103 (1966).
297. "A provision that may seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the remainder of
the statutory scheme - because the same terminology is used elsewhere in a context that makes
its meaning clear ... or because only one of the permissible meanings produces a substantive
effect that is compatible with the rest of the law." Timbers, 484 U.S. 365, 371. But cf. Dewsnup
v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773, 776, 778 (1992) (holding that ambiguity of'§ 506(d) is not resolved by
reference to interrelationship with § 506(a)).
298. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988).
299. The court's equitable discretion to disencumber a secured creditor's security interest in
postpetition revenue derived from prepetition collateral is unique. Nowhere else in the
Bankruptcy Code does a court have discretion to avoid a properly perfected lien. To the contrary,
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Thus, the secured claim of the creditor includes the "gross" postpetition
rentals if sections 506(a) and 552 are construed together.
Then, the secured claim of the creditor can be reduced under sec-
tion 506(c) for an amount equal to the postpetition expenses necessary to
maintain and operate the remainder of the secured creditor's collateral
(i.e., the real property and improvements). 30 0 Consequently, when sec-
tion 506(c) reductions are added to the mix, the secured creditor's
secured claim is only increased in the amount of the "net" rents. The
foregoing statutory analysis is consistent with Timbers, in which the
Supreme Court recognized that a security interest in rents enforceable
under state law is "a condition of having them applied to satisfying the
claim of the secured creditor ahead of the claims of unsecured
creditors." 0'
The foregoing analysis, while shedding some light on the issue, is
not conclusive. For example, the secured creditor's receipt of net rents
during the pendency of the Chapter 11 case may allow the secured credi-
tor to receive more than the present value of its secured claim in viola-
tion of section 1129(b)(2)(A)(i). A secured creditor is only entitled to
the present value of its secured claim as of the "effective date" of a
Chapter 11 plan. If the secured creditor receives reductions of its
secured claim before confirmation, a post-effective date market rate of
interest on the remainder of the secured claim will enable the secured
creditor to receive a net present value in excess of what would have been
received if postpetition (pre-effective date) net rents were not in fact
paid to the undersecured creditor.
Moreover, the Bankruptcy Code has specific provisions dealing
with postpetition entitlements for secured creditors-namely, section
506(b). There is, however, no provision in the Bankruptcy Code specifi-
cally granting an undersecured creditor a right to postpetition interest.
This is true even if the undersecured creditor's collateral is producing
income. Consequently, it is appropriate to examine the law prior to the
enactment of the Bankruptcy Code. 302
3. THE SURVIVAL OF PRE-BANKRUPTCY CODE LAW
Because the Bankruptcy Code does not address the right of an
undersecured creditor to receive the net rents generated from its collat-
courts are required to provide adequate protection for all other security interests. 11 U.S.C.
§§ 361-364 (1988).
300. See David G. Carlson, Secured Creditors And Expenses Of Bankruptcy Administration, 70
N. CAR. L. REv. 417 (1992).
301. Timbers, 484 U.S. at 374.
302. Dewsnup, 112 S. Ct. at 779 (When Congress amended the bankruptcy laws, it did not start
from scratch.).
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eral postpetition, it is appropriate to examine the rights of undersecured
creditors to postpetition payments before the enactment of the Bank-
ruptcy Code. Indeed, "[t]he normal rule of statutory construction is that
if Congress intends for legislation to change the interpretation of a judi-
cially created concept, it makes that intent specific. 30 3 This rule should
be followed with particular care when construing the Bankruptcy
Code. 3° Thus, unless Congress provides a clear indication of its intent
to abandon past bankruptcy practices, the Bankruptcy Code should be
construed in accordance with pre-Code law.30 5
The pre-Bankruptcy Code practice is clear. In Sexton v. Drey-
fus, 3 06 the Supreme Court squarely addressed the entitlement of under-
secured creditors to postpetition payments. In Sexton, the undersecured
creditors requested to have cash proceeds of liquidated collateral applied
to postpetition interest that accrued prior to the liquidation. The under-
secured creditors would then apply the proceeds to a paydown of the
principal. Thus, if postpetition interest were paid in cash, the under-
secured party would have a larger unsecured deficiency claim in the
bankruptcy case.30 7 Justice Holmes, in delivering the unanimous opin-
ion of the Court, stated the general rule that undersecured creditors are
not entitled to postpetition interest.308 Justice Holmes recognized, how-
ever, that an undersecured party may receive postpetition interest when
the collateral produced income, but not otherwise.30 9 Specifically, Jus-
tice Holmes stated: "There is no more reason for allowing the bankrupt
estate to profit by the delay beyond the day of settlement than there is
for letting the creditors do so. Therefore, to apply these subsequent divi-
dends, [etc.], to subsequent interest seems just. '310
Perhaps because the question was authoritatively settled in Sexton,
there are almost no cases under the Bankruptcy Act addressing under-
secured creditors' entitlement to postpetition interest from its collateral.
Consequently, the pre-Bankruptcy Code practice would clearly entitle an
undersecured creditor to receive the net rents, at least to the extent of the
postpetition interest accrual. Since the postpetition interest accrual gen-
erally exceeds the monthly net rental income, pre-Bankruptcy Code
practice would generally entitle an undersecured creditor to all the
303. Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 501 (1986);
Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 47 (1986).
304. Bonner Mall Partnership v. U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co., 2 F.3d 899, 912 (9th Cir. 1993)
(citing Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 501).
305. Id. (citing Pennsylvania Public Welfare Dep't v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 563 (1990)).
306. 219 U.S. 339 (1911).
307. Id. at 346.
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id.
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postpetition net rentals without reduction of the principal amount of the
debt.311
4. THE BANKRUPTCY CODE LIMITS INTEREST TO THE SECURED
PORTION OF AN UNDERSECURED CREDITOR'S CLAIM
Unlike the Bankruptcy Act, the Bankruptcy Code expressly
addresses creditors' rights to postpetition interest. Section 502(b) of the
Bankruptcy Code does not allow a claim for unmatured interest.312 In
addition, section 726(a)(5) of the Bankruptcy Code states that, in a case
involving a solvent Chapter 7 estate, unsecured creditors may receive
postpetition interest.31 3 The unsecured portion of an undersecured claim
is similar to, and treated for the most part like, an unsecured claim.
Thus, the Bankruptcy Code would be violated if postpetition interest is
paid on the unsecured portion of an undersecured claim. This conclu-
sion is reinforced by the construction of sections 1111 (b)(2) and
1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II) of the Bankruptcy Code. Even though an under-
secured creditor may elect to be treated as fully secured,31 4 such under-
secured creditor is only entitled to the present value (i.e., "interest") on
the "secured" portion of the claims.3'5 Consequently, an undersecured
creditor should receive interest only on the secured portion of its claim.
5. APPLICATION OF SECTION 552(B) EQUITABLE CONSIDERATIONS
Section 552(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, while extending protection
to certain prepetition security interests, nevertheless allows a court to
void such security interests "after notice and a hearing and based on the
equities of the case. 316 The question, therefore, arises as to whether or
when an admitted cash collateral interest in net rents should be disen-
cumbered and made available to pay general unsecured creditors. In
Butner v. United States, 31 7 the Supreme Court determined that state law
should apply to a mortgagee's property rights and held that bankruptcy
courts should "take whatever steps are necessary to ensure that the mort-
gagee is afforded in federal bankruptcy court the same protection he
311. See Robert E. Scott, Sharing The Risks of Bankruptcy: Timbers, Afilers and Beyond,
1989 COL. Bus. L. REV. 183, 185 n.5 (1989).
312. 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(2) (1988).
313. 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(5) (1988). See also Thompson v. Kentucky Lumber Co., 860 F.2d
674, 679 (6th Cir. 1988); Fed. Say. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Moneymaker, 96 B.R. 287, 290 (C.D.
Cal. 1988); Boyer v. Bernstein, 90 B.R. 200, 201 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1988); Commissioner of
Revenue v. Adcom, Inc., 89 B.R. 2 (D. Mass. 1988).
314. 11 U.S.C. § IIlI(b)(2) (1988).
315. Id. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II) (1988).
316. Id. § 552(b) (1988).
317. 440 U.S. 48 (1979).
[Vol. 48:691
NET RENTS IN BANKRUPTCY
would have under state law if no bankruptcy had ensued."3" 8 At least
one published decision has interpreted Butner to mean that:
While the mortgagee should not have any lesser property interest
because of the bankruptcy filing, it would equally violate the Butner
standard to give the mortgagee greater rights in the rentals than it
would have absent a bankruptcy filing.319
On the other hand, the First Circuit, in citing the legislative history
of section 552(b), concluded:
The 'equities of the case' proviso is a legislative attempt to
address those instances where expenditures of the estate enhance the
value of proceeds which, if not adjusted, would lead to an unjust
improvement of the secured party's position. In such cases Congress
intended for courts to limit the secured party's interest in the pro-
ceeds according to the equities of the case so as to avoid prejudicing
the unsecured creditors.32°
In further support of its interpretation of the "equities of the case"
instruction, the Cross Baking court noted:
[T]he flexible approach taken by section 552(b) permits the
court to preserve valid security interests in proceeds, rents and the
like, but at the same time, allows the court to protect the interests of
the unsecured creditors.321
Thus, depending on the Court's evaluation of the equity,32 2 net
rents may be apportioned between the estate and the secured party as the
court deems appropriate. In considering the "equities of the case," cer-
tain facts deserve attention. For example, if the undersecured creditor
was entitled to increase its secured claim by the amount the net rent
exceeds postpetition interest, the undersecured creditor would be receiv-
ing its full opportunity costs during the pendency of a bankruptcy pro-
ceeding. Notably, postconfirmation the unsecured creditor is entitled to
interest only on its secured claim, even if the net rent exceeds the
amount of interest due on the secured claim.
318. Id. at 56.
319. In re Rancourt, 123 B.R. 143, 150 (Bankr. D. N.H. 1991) (emphasis in original).
320. New Hampshire Business Dev. Corp. v. Cross Baking Co., 818 F.2d 1027, 1033 (1st Cir.
1987) (citing S. Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. 91 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5787, 5877; H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 376-77 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5963, 6333).
321. Cross Baking, 818 F.2d at 1033.
322. Unlike other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, section 552(b) expressly allows the
bankruptcy court discretion to determine the "equities of the case." Defining the proper scope of a
court's discretionary power has been the subject of other articles. See, e.g., Honorable Henry J.
Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747 (1982).
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B. Normative Bankruptcy Principles
1. THE CLASSIC CREDITORS' BARGAIN
In 1979, Professors Thomas Jackson and Anthony Kronman cre-
ated a new law-and-economic analysis of bankruptcy.323 Soon thereaf-
ter, Thomas Jackson developed the "creditors' bargain" model to
analyze virtually every bankruptcy issue by asking the question what
creditors would have agreed to if they had been asked in advance.3 24
Professor Jackson argues that normative bankruptcy principles should be
viewed as resolving a common-pool problem caused by a state-law sys-
tem of individual creditor remedies where the debtor does not have
enough assets to satisfy all of the claims.325 Obviously a collection of
assets can be more valuable when held together than they would be if
they were immediately divided and distributed. Even though a debtor
may be insolvent and the common pool insufficient to satisfy all claims,
creditors as a group may be better off if the assets of the debtor are held
together and individual creditor actions are postponed in an attempt to
maximize the value of the assets to satisfy the claims. 326 Professor Jack-
son supposes that by imposing a collective and compulsory proceeding
on creditors that supersedes state "grab law," bankruptcy laws provide a
mechanism to maximize the value of the assets of the common pool.
3 27
Notwithstanding the collective norm embodied by the creditors'
bargain, Professors Thomas Jackson and Douglas Baird argue that bank-
ruptcy law should not alter the prebankruptcy (state law) entitlements
among creditors. 328 They believe that a secured creditor who has state
law priority over unsecured creditors should always maintain that prior-
ity irrespective of the goal of maximizing the collective benefit.3 29 They
contend that the retention and foreclosure of collateral does not impair
323. Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities Among
Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143 (1979).
324. Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors'
Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857, 860 (1982) (analyzing "bankruptcy as a system designed to mirror the
agreement one would expect the creditors to form among themselves were they able to negotiate
such an agreement from an ex ante position").
325. THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 10-11 (1986).
326. Id. at 14.
327. Thomas H. Jackson & Robert E. Scott, On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay on
Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditors' Bargain, 75 VA. L. REV. 155, 160 (1989) ("The
hypothetical bargain thus yields a normative criterion, grounded on principles of autonomy, for
evaluating the legitimacy of the bankruptcy process.").
328. Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment
of Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in
Bankruptcy, 51 U. CH. L. REv. 97, 103 (1984) ("[B]ankruptcy law is, and should be, concerned
with the interests of those ... who, outside of bankruptcy, have property rights . .
329. Id. at 110.
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the value-maximization goal in any meaningful manner.33° They argue
that a bankruptcy rule that avoids an entitlement which is valid against
unsecured creditors under non-bankruptcy law provides a perverse
incentive to general creditors to file a bankruptcy petition.33'
Bankruptcy law, analyzed by the law-and-economics movement
through the "creditors' bargain," became the subject of a highly charged
debate regarding the right of an undersecured creditor to postpetition
interest. The law-and-economics bankruptcy theory propounded by
Professors Jackson and Baird is that promoting reorganization without
requiring payment of all real costs (including postpetition interest) is
economically inefficient.332 Specifically, proponents of the "creditors'
bargain" recommend that undersecured creditors should receive postpe-
tition interest on the secured portions of their claims. 333 In Timbers,
however, the Supreme Court rejected the law-and-economics theory of
the "creditors' bargain." Moreover, as one commentator noted, the law-
and-economics theory of the creditors' bargain has lost much of its
appeal in recent times:
Since Timbers of Inwood Forest, the creditors' bargain has been in
recession. Most typically, law professors have complained about the
totalizing nature of the utilitarianism implicit in the creditors' bar-
gain. In such criticism, maximizing wealth is conceded to be a valid
330. Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution, Form Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A Reply to
Warren, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 815, 824-28 (1987). This argument, however, is subject to dispute.
Craig H. Averch & Michael J. Collins, Avoidance of Foreclosure Sales as Preferential Transfers:
Another Serious Threat to Secured Creditors, 24 TEX. TECH L. REV. 985, 1033 (1993).
Specifically, the authors stated the following:
There is, perhaps, at least one more way to view the role of bankruptcy law on the
non-bankruptcy relationship of creditors. Specifically, there are two major
characteristics governing the non-bankruptcy relationship between secured and
unsecured creditors that deserves enforcement in bankruptcy. First, secured
creditors are entitled to the pledged assets of the debtor to the fill extent of the
security interest. This entitlement, of course, does not allow the secured creditor to
receive more than payment in full. Second, unsecured creditors are entitled to the
value of the pledged assets in excess of what is necessary to compensate the secured
creditors. Enforcing this "bargain" under state law is next to impossible.
Unsecured creditors are generally not entitled to notice of a foreclosure sale. And,
even if so notified, would be in the awkward position of either bidding at the
foreclosure sale or losing the equity. Consequently, it is appropriate for bankruptcy
policy to enforce the foregoing "bargains" between secured and unsecured creditors.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
331. JACKSON, supra note 325.
332. Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Kovacs and Toxic Wastes in Bankruptcy, 36
STAN. L. REV. 1199, 1202-03 (1984).
333. Thomas Jackson filed amicus briefs on this question. See In re Timbers of Inwood Forest
Associates, 808 F.2d 363, 380 (Jones, J. dissenting); brief for amicus curiae, Thomas H. Jackson,
pro se (October term 1987) (LDK. no. 86-1602); In re Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 108 S.
Ct. 626 (1988); Crocker Nat'l Bank v. American Mariner Indus., Inc., 734 F.2d 426, 435 n.10 (9th
Cir. 1984).
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goal, but the complaint is that other worthy goals are excluded in this
wealth maximizing theory. [Note omitted.] Criticism exists from
within the tradition of economic theory as well.334
Perhaps Professor Elizabeth Warren best characterized the state of bank-
ruptcy economic modeling by stating:
To model improved systems that operate only in perfect markets, or
to ignore the high costs of collection outside the bankruptcy system
when critiquing the high costs of collection in bankruptcy, is to
design an airplane that carries no payload, flies only in a gravity-free
environment, and consumes no fuel. The exercise may be great fun,
but it yields little that is useful for those who need to build planes that
fly. It is important to separate debates about bankruptcy fancy from
debates about bankruptcy policy.335
2. TRADITIONAL BANKRUPTCY POLICIES
With the failure of the "creditors' bargain" to yield any significant,
positive bankruptcy law, commentators have attempted to develop new
theories to explain bankruptcy law.336 As one commentator noted, there
is no deep-rooted policy structure to bankruptcy law that can be deter-
mined from normative economic theory.33 7 Because bankruptcy laws
are a "historic artifact, ' 338 the guiding philosophies of bankruptcy laws
should be examined through the historical development of the Bank-
ruptcy Code. Consequently, it is perhaps more appropriate to examine
the simplified, traditional bankruptcy policies.
Traditionally, bankruptcy law has been considered to promote two
basic policies - the "Equity Policy" and the "Reorganization Pol-
icy."'339 No doubt, the Equity Policy and Reorganization Policy are
amorphous. That is, what one person believes appropriately serves a
given policy, another person can probably provide counter-justifications
334. David G. Carlson, Bankruptcy Theory and the Creditors' Bargain, 61 U. Cn. L. REV.
453, 456 (1992).
335. Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policymaking in an Imperfect World, 92 MICH. L. REV.
336, 386 (1993).
336. See id. at 336 (recognizing that "thoughtful articulation of bankruptcy policy has fallen on
somewhat hard times"); Donald R. Korobkin, Contractarianism and the Normative Foundations
of Bankruptcy Law, 71 TEx. L. REv. 541 (1993); Lucian A. Bebchuck, A New Approach to
Corporate Reorganizations, 101 HARv. L. REV. 775 (1988).
337. David G. Carlson, Philosophy in Bankruptcy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1341, 1389 (1989)
(finding the search for a "deep structure" for bankruptcy to be futile).
338. Id.
339. The two policies are not complex. Simply put, they are the fostering of the
equitable distribution of a troubled company's assets through the equal sharing of
losses by creditors of equal rank, and the restructuring of a business to preserve
jobs, to pay creditors, to produce a return for owners, and to obtain for the Nation
the fruits of American enterprise.
MARTIN J. BIENENSTOCK, BANKRUPTCY REORGANIZATION 1-2 (PLI 1987) (footnotes omitted].
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for the opposite result under the same policy. Nonetheless, this Article
attempts to provide one view of a narrow issue through the traditional
Equity and Reorganization Policies as embodied in the Bankruptcy
Code.
The Equity Policy underlying bankruptcy law has been described to
"facilitate ... equality of distribution among creditors of the debtor. '' 310
The structure of the Bankruptcy Code establishes that like creditors
should be treated the same.34' The United States Supreme Court has
emphasized that "[e]quality of distribution among creditors is a central
policy of the Bankruptcy Code. According to that policy, creditors of
equal priority should receive pro rata shares of the debtor's property. 342
Based on the fundamental principle embodied in the Equity Policy,
distributions should not be made to prepetition unsecured creditors
outside a plan. Otherwise, the principle of equality of distribution may
be violated because until confirmation of a plan, a bankruptcy court can-
not determine whether like creditors will be treated the same.343
The payment of interest on the unsecured portion of an under-
secured claim would violate the Equity Policy for at least one reason.
Unless the debtor is solvent, unsecured creditors are not going to receive
interest on the account of their claims. The payment of interest on the
unsecured portion of the undersecured claim, therefore, enables the
undersecured creditor to receive a greater distribution on the account of
the unsecured portion of its claim. There is no substantive difference
between the undersecured portion of a claim held by a secured creditor
and any other unsecured claim. 3 " Consequently, the Equity Policy can
be construed to prohibit the payment of interest on the unsecured portion
of an undersecured creditor's claim.
On the other hand, the Equity Policy has always permitted the
undersecured creditor the right to receive postpetition interest from the
encumbered income derived from the undersecured creditor's collateral.
The equitable principle that encumbered assets not be used to benefit
one class of creditors at the expense of another class345 is unaffected if
340. H.R. REP. No. 95, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., at 338-39 (1977). See Sampsell v. Imperial
Paper & Color Corp., 313 U.S. 215, 219 (1941) ("[T]he theme of the Bankruptcy Act [of 1898] is
equality of distribution.").
341. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 177-78 at 339 (1977).
342. Begier v. Internal Revenue Serv., 110 S. Ct. 2258, 2262-63 (1990).
343. See, e.g., Official Committee of Equity Security Holders v. Mabey, 832 F.2d 299 (4th Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 962 (1988); 11 U.S.C. § 507 (Bankruptcy Code system of priorities).
344. Perhaps to adjust for certain perceptions of unfairness, the Bankruptcy Code allows an
undersecured creditor to elect to be treated as fully secured in a chapter 11 case. 11 U.S.C.
§ lll(b)(2). Even then, however, an undersecured creditor is not entitled to interest on the
undersecured portion of its claim. 11 U.S.C. § 11 29(b)(2)(A)(i)(II).
345. United Sav. Ass'n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 793 F.2d 1380,
1994]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
the undersecured creditor is receiving postpetition interest from unen-
cumbered funds.
Application of the Reorganization Policy is considerably more dif-
ficult. Although it is relatively clear that opportunity-cost payments run
counter to the Reorganization Policy,346 the payment of interest from
encumbered funds cannot be so clearly analyzed under the Reorganiza-
tion Policy. Generally, when a debtor seeks to reorganize under federal
bankruptcy law, it is typically because the debtor is unable to make
interest payments to the secured creditor. Therefore, it could be argued
that the imposition of the requirement to pay postpetition interest to a
secured creditor may severely impede the opportunity for a debtor to
reorganize. This argument, however, misses an important point. That
is, the debtor is required to pay interest to the secured creditor only out
of encumbered income derived from collateral that is pledged to the
secured creditor. If there is no income, the Equity Policy does not
require (and in fact would prohibit) the payment of interest to an under-
secured creditor. Thus, it is not a significant burden on the debtor to
make interest payments from encumbered income, and such a require-
ment does not run counter to the Reorganization Policy.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court was not asked to, and did not, decide in Tim-
bers whether an undersecured creditor was entitled to postpetition inter-
est from an encumbered income stream. Supreme Court precedent
existing prior to the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code was clear that
undersecured creditors are entitled to postpetition interest from an
encumbered income stream. Nothing in the Bankruptcy Code prohibits
an undersecured creditor from receiving interest from encumbered
income. The return-of-collateral treatment of net rents reaches the right
result in many cases. However, courts should use the principles of
equity referenced in section 552(b) of the Bankruptcy Code to credit net
rents exceeding accrued interest against the amount of the undersecured
lender's claim.
In failing to recognize that undersecured creditors are entitled to
postpetition interest from encumbered income, the conflicting caselaw
has created confusion over the application and character of postpetition
net rents. By understanding that the encumbered net rents can be used to
1387, aff'd, 808 F.2d 363 (5th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 484 U.S. 365 (1988) ("In summary, the interest
provisions of the Code and its predecessors, as interpreted by the Supreme Court for almost a
century, are premised on the equitable principle that the unencumbered assets of a debtor's estate
will not be used to benefit one class of creditors at the expense of another class.").
346. BIENENSTOCK, supra note 339, at 181.
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pay interest on the secured portion of an undersecured creditor's claim,
most, if not all, of the confusion can be eliminated.
